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Minority Discounts, Fair Market Value,
and the Culture of Estate Taxation
WILLIAM S. BLATr*
I. INTRODUCTION
In valuing blocks of corporate stock, courts often permit a minority
discount-a reduction in value that reflects the difficulty of selling
shares lacking corporate control.' The allowance of minority dis-
counts encourages transactions designed to reduce transfer taxes.2
Taxpayers keep property in corporate solution, sometimes in tiered
holding companies,3 and gradually transfer corporate control through
multiple gifts of small blocks. Long contested by the government, 4 mi-
* Professor of Law, University of Miami School of Law. I would like to thank Jack
Bogdanski, Mary Coombs, Joseph Dodge, Mary Louise Fellows, John Gaubatz, Pat
Gudridge, Mike Livingston, Grayson McCouch, George Mundstock, Jeff Pennell, Mark
Ramseyer, Jim Repetti, Tom Robinson, Deborah Schenk, Sam Thompson, and Larry
Zelenak for comments on earlier drafts of this Article. I would also like to thank
participants at a faculty workshop held at the University of Miami in March 1996, at a
scholarly paper presentation at the Association of American Law Schools annual meeting
in January 1997, and at a meeting of the Teaching Taxation Committee of the ABA Tax
Section in May, 1997. This Article received honorable mention in the 1996 AALS
scholarly paper competition.
1 This reduction assumes, for example, that unless held as part of a controlling interest, a
block of stock equal to 20% of the outstanding stock is worth less than 20% of the value of
the corporation. This lower price reflects the exclusion of the block from corporate
decisionmaking.
2 Transfer taxes refer to estate, gift, and generation-skipping taxes collectively. The es-
tate tax, a tax on transfers occurring at death, was enacted in 1916. Revenue Act of 1916,
ch. 463, § 201, 39 Stat. 756, 777. The current gift tax, a tax on lifetime transfers, was en-
acted in 1932. Revenue Act of 1932, ch. 209, § 501, 47 Stat. 169,245-46. Since 1976, these
taxes have applied a single progressive rate schedule to an individual's cumulative trans-
fers. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 2001, 90 Stat. 1520, 1846-54. The
current tax on generation-skipping transfers was enacted in 1986. Tax Reform Act of 1986,
Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 1431, 100 Stat. 2085, 2717-29.
3 Tiered holding companies multiply the applicable discounts. E.g., Whittemore v. Fitz-
patrick, 127 F. Supp. 710 (D. Conn. 1954) (allowing successive discounts of 11, 50, and
16%); Dean v. Commissioner, 19 T.C.M. (CCH) 281 (1960) (allowing successive discounts
of 21, 14, and 20% to reflect the effect of intervening corporate shells).
4 The total number of cases discussing minority discounts exceeds 90. A WESTLAW
search conducted on February 6, 1998 indicated that -minority" occurred within five words
of "discount" in 97 cases since 1945 (FTX-CS Database). See also George Cooper, A
Voluntary Tax? New Perspectives on Sophisticated Estate Tax Avoidance, 77 Colum. L
Rev. 161, 201 n.121 (1977) (counting 63 cases between 1950 and 1975).
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nority discounts have cost the Treasury billions in lost taxes.5 Anecdo-
tal evidence indicates that the size of minority discounts have grown
over time6 and that their use has soared.7 The most recent innovation
is the discount partnership." Rather than give property away outright,
a donor first contributes it to a partnership and then transfers an inter-
est in the partnership. In calculating her gift tax, she relies on the
existence of a partnership to claim a substantial discount.9
Many voice misgivings about the use of minority discounts to re-
duce transfer taxes.10 Expert discussion of discounts turns on the
5 In 1998, the Joint Committee on Taxation estimated that a proposal eliminating non-
business valuation discounts would raise an amount ranging from $485 million to $628
million per year in the years 2000 to 2008. Joint Committee on Taxation, Estimated
Budget Effects of the President's Budgetary Proposal for Fiscal Year 1999 (visited June 1,
1998) <http://www.house.gov/jct/x-14-98.html> (published Feb. 24, 1998). Revenue esti-
mates of a different proposal by the Joint Committee in 1987 suggest that minority dis-
counts cost roughly $1 billion in lost revenue in 1988 and 1989. Compare H.R. Rep. No.
100-391, at 1638 (1987) (estimating that proposals curtailing both minority discount and
estate freeze transactions raised $1.2 billion between October, 1987 and January, 1990),
with H.R. Conf. Rep. 100-495, at 1025 (1987), reprinted in 1987-3 C.B. 193,305 (estimating
that estate freeze proposal alone raised only $109 million over that time period). Although
differences in data, economic assumptions, and proposals may diminish the estimates' com-
parability, they illustrate the magnitude of the revenue involved.
A single case cost the Treasury hundreds of millions. Estate of Newhouse v. Commis-
sioner, 94 T.C. 193, 247 (1990) (valuing common stock at $176 million instead of at the
underlying property's value of $1.2 billion); Cooper, note 4, at 199 (describing the potential
tax savings from another case as in the tens of millions).
6 Survey Shows Trend Towards Larger Minority Discounts, 10 Est. Plan. 281 (1983)
(describing the Service's acceptance of higher discounts).
7 Professional journals reveal growing interest in minority discounts. A WESTLAW
search conducted on February 6, 1998 indicated that "minority" occurred within five words
of "discount" in 14 articles published between 1971 and 1985, in 116 articles published
between 1985 and 1990, and in 524 articles published after 1989 (TX-TP Database). This is
largely because Congress enacted chapter 14 in 1990, which blessed minority discounts
while shutting down other estate planning transactions. See, e.g., Wayne L. Warnken &
Pamela R. Champine, Securing the Minority Discount for Family Business Transfers, Tr. &
Est., Apr. 1993, at 49 (noting that chapter 14 did not alter the use of discounts in valuing
minority stock).
8 Dennis I. Belcher, Drafting Agreements to Take Advantage of Valuation Discounts,
30 Inst. on Est. Plan. 1 1000 (1996) (describing how to draft partnership agreements to take
advantage of valuation discounts); Michael D. Mulligan & Angela Fick Braly, Family Lim-
ited Partnerships Can Create Discounts, 21 Est. Plan. 195 (1994); Susan Scherreik, How to
Share the Wealth and Keep Control, Bus. Wk., Jan. 17, 1994, at 94 (describing use of family
limited partnerships to obtain valuation discount); Lee A. Sheppard, Can the IRS Chal-
lenge Family Limited Partnerships?, 63 Tax Notes 1388 (June 13, 1994).
9 Jeffrey N. Pennell, Valuation Discord: An Exegesis of Wealth Transfer Tax Valuation
Theory and Practice, 30 Inst. on Est. Plan. & 900, at 34 (1996).
10 2 Treasury Dep't, Tax Reform for Fairness, Simplicity, and Economic Growth 386-87
(1984) (proposal for taxation of minority discounts); Cooper, note 4, at 195-204, 226-28,
230-32; Joseph M. Dodge, Redoing the Estate and Gift Taxes Along Easy-to-Value Lines,
43 Tax L. Rev. 241, 254-56 (1988); Alan L. Feld, The Implications of Minority Interest and
Stock Restrictions in Valuing Closely-Held Shares, 122 U. Pa. L. Rev. 934, 934-46 (1974);
Mary Louise Fellows & William H. Painter, Valuing Close Corporations for Federal
Wealth Transfer Taxes: A Statutory Solution to the Disappearing Wealth Syndrome, 30
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meaning of fair market value, the legal standard for tax valuation.
The principal question for tax experts is whether the allowance of mi-
nority discounts for family-owned companies reflects fair market
value. Experts take divergent positions on this issue and have yet to
reach agreement.
This Article contends that misgivings about minority discounts can-
not be resolved by appeals to the market. Market economics in fact
yields no firm conclusions about the appropriateness of discounts.
This Article offers an alternative basis for thinking about minority dis-
counts, one that draws from concepts that pervade American culture.
These concepts underlie popular intuitions of tax abuse and influence
legal attitudes toward closely held entities.
This Article consists of four sections. The first describes the current
tax policy debate over minority discounts, which revolves around the
meaning of fair market value. Professional appraisers, tax reformers,
and judges all invoke this standard to different ends. Appraisers as-
certain fair market value by approximating public markets. Pointing
to the inflated prices commanded by takeover targets and the de-
pressed prices paid for closed-end mutual funds, they routinely value
corporate stock by first determining its pro rata share of corporate
value and reducing that amount for lack of control. Reformers
counter that such reductions understate the market value of family-
owned companies by ignoring likely behavior. They assert that family
members govern these companies jointly and sell their interests to-
gether for pro rata value, rather than separately at a discount. Most
courts reject the reformers' argument and affirm that minority dis-
counts reflect objective value. They claim that other standards man-
date a speculative inquiry into the owners' subjective intent. These
judicial pronouncements, however, have failed to end the debate.
The second Section argues that experts cannot evaluate the appro-
priateness of minority discounts by looking to the market. An exten-
sive corporate finance literature suggests that minority discounts
cannot be incorporated into market theory. The traditional efficient
market hypothesis posits that stock price reflects the value of the un-
derlying assets. It seems clear, however, that managerial behavior and
investor preferences often cause stock price to deviate from asset
value. Accordingly, some scholars back away from the traditional effi-
cient market hypothesis and assert that stocks and assets are sold in
Stan. L. Rev. 895 (1978); James R. Repetti, Minority Discounts: The Alchemy in Estate
and Gift Taxation, 50 Tax L. Rev. 415, 467-82 (1995); Thomas D. Hall, Comment, Valuing
Closely Held Stock: Control Premiums and Minority Discounts, 31 Emory lU. 139 (1982);
Steven E. Monical, Note, The Effect of Corporate Control on Valuation of Closely Held
Corporate Stock for Federal Estate and Gift Tax Purposes, 1982 U. Ill. L Rev. 775.
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separate and distinct markets. This assertion explains why stock
prices diverge from underlying asset values.
The corporate finance literature undermines the various positions
taken in the current tax policy debate. The literature refutes the judi-
cial understanding that minority discounts reflect objective value. In
fact, there is no objective value, only a price for stock and a price for
assets. This research also contradicts the reformer position that dis-
counts should be disallowed for stock in family-owned companies.
The situation is actually not so clear cut. The root causes of minority
discounts, managerial behavior and investor preference, diminish but
do not disappear with family ownership.
Finally, the literature casts doubt on routine appraisal methods for
closely held businesses. By valuing the entire corporation and then
adjusting for control, appraisers implicitly assume that managerial be-
havior and investor preference only depress value. The corporate fi-
nance literature shows, however, that these factors also can enhance
value. By omitting this potential enhancement, appraisers understate
the value of closely held businesses.
The third Section offers an alternative way to think about minority
discounts by drawing from two pervasive cultural constructions: con-
centrations of wealth and family businesses. Each construct suggests a
different attitude toward the estate tax. When viewed as a method of
attacking the rich, the tax seems well justified; when seen as falling on
family businesses, it appears burdensome. These two constructs domi-
nate public debate over transfer taxation and underlie popular intu-
itions about the abusiveness of fragmenting property. Moreover,
despite their fuzziness, these constructs deeply influence legal ap-
proaches to closely owned entities.
The fourth Section uses the cultural constructs to assess proposals
for addressing minority discounts. Proposals attributing stock owner-
ship among family members or taxing disguised transfers occurring
through the exercise or nonexercise of retained rights are likely to be
viewed as onerous. More attractive is a proposal to aggregate trans-
fers by the donor or donee. This proposal would prevent a controlling
shareholder from obtaining a discount on the transfer of control sim-
ply by making successive gifts of minority interests. The most attrac-
tive proposal presumes that stock is worth at least its pro rata share of
the value of corporate assets if sold in liquidation. This proposal
would stop taxpayers from obtaining discounts by transferring passive
assets in corporate solution. It thereby would shut down the most out-
rageous transactions utilizing minority discounts.
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H. THE TAx POLICY DEBATE OVER MINORITY DISCOUNTS N
TAXATION: THE MEANING OF FRUR AL%.RKET VALUE
The current policy debate over the allowance of minority discounts
for family-owned companies revolves around the concept of fair mar-
ket value, "the price at which the property would change hands be-
tween a willing buyer and willing seller, neither being under any
compulsion to buy or sell and both having reasonable knowledge of
relevant facts."'" This standard requires predicting the behavior of a
hypothetical buyer and seller. 12 Actual sales, though relevant, are not
necessarily determinative. 13
The fair market value standard claims support in traditional tax pol-
icy norms. In theory, subjective value may be the fairest and most
efficient valuation standard. By inquiring into what a particular
owner would pay for the property, that standard considers individual
well-being and does not affect taxpayer behavior. Since subjective
value is the point at which the owner is indifferent between retaining
and selling the property, use of that value assures that the tax-payer
cannot increase his personal welfare by changing his behavior.1 4 A
subjective value standard is widely regarded as inadministrable, how-
ever, because there is seldom any evidence of subjective value besides
self-serving taxpayer testimony. This leaves fair market value as the
most administrable alternative. By inquiring into the price to which
willing people would agree, that standard assures that no taxpayer will
be obviously favored or face discernable incentives to alter behavior.
Despite the broad consensus supporting the fair market value stan-
dard, opinions about minority discounts are extremely diverse. Profes-
sional appraisers, tax reformers, and judges take different positions,
and despite authoritative judicial pronouncements, controversy
continues.
11 Reg. § 202031-1(b).
12 Judge Jerome Frank described valuation as an inquiry into -what-you-could-have-got-
for-it-in-money-if-you-had-sold-it." Andrews v. Commissioner, 135 F.2d 314, 317 (2d Cir.
1943).
13 For example, fair market value is not determined by a forced sale price. Reg.
§ 20.2031-1(b). For publicly traded property, past sales are determinative of value. Reg.
§ 20.2031-2(b) (the value of stock and bonds traded on exchanges is usually the mean be-
tween the highest and lowest quoted selling price on the valuation date).
14 See Joseph Bankman, Thomas D. Griffith & Katherine Pratt, Federal Income Tax:
Examples & Explanations 39 (1996) (arguing that taxation of subjective value is fairest and
most efficient).
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A. Appraisers: Minority Discounts as Approximating
Public Markets
Appraisers regard minority discounts as necessary to approximate
prices found in public markets. They generally value closely held
stock in two steps. 15 They first value the entire company and then
make adjustments for special factors. They use a similar approach for
valuing partnership interests and undivided interests in property.
Appraisers determine total firm value using one of three methods:
market, asset, or income.16 The market method compares the com-
pany in question with guideline public companies.17 Criteria for se-
lecting guideline companies include capital structure, credit status,
depth of management, and personnel experience.' 8 The asset method
sums up the value of corporate assets and subtracts liabilities. 19 The
value of assets varies depending on whether they are used in a going
concern or sold in an orderly disposition. 20 The income method deter-
mines value by dividing the expected economic income by a discount
rate derived from public companies.21 Economic income is taxable
income adjusted for items such as noncash charges and capital ex-
penditures, but not for unrealized appreciation.22 In the absence of
comparable guideline companies, appraisers use the asset method for
holding companies and the income method for operating companies.
Sometimes they consider both in a weighted average. 23
After determining pro rata value, appraisers make adjustments
designed to reflect a half dozen or so features that depress or enhance
15 The Service enumerates a host of facts to be considered in valuing closely held busi-
nesses. These include the history and nature of the business, the industry and general
economic outlook, book value and financial condition, earning capacity, dividend-paying
capacity, existence of goodwill or other intangible value, prior sales and the size of the
block of the stock, and comparisons to similar publicly traded companies. Rev. Rul. 59-60,
1959-1 C.B. 237.
16 Gary R. Albrecht, Calculating the Value of a Closely Held Firm, J. Legal Econ., Dec.
1991, at 1 (describing liquidation value and various earnings-based values); James R.
Hitchner, Valuation of Closely Held Businesses, 23 Tax Adviser 471, 472-73 (1992)
(describing income, market, and cost approaches).
17 Shannon P. Pratt, Robert F. Reilly & Robert P. Schweihs, Valuing a Business: The
Analysis and Appraisal of Closely Held Companies 203-38 (3d ed. 1996) (describing mar-
ket method).
18 Id. at 211-12 (listing criteria for selecting comparable companies).
19 Id. at 256-59 (describing asset method).
20 Id. at 262 (assets may be valued in continued use, as part of a going concern, in place,
as part of a mass assemblage of assets, in exchange, as part of an orderly disposition, or in
exchange, as part of a forced liquidation).
21 Id. at 153-58 (describing income method).
22 Id. at 156-57 (defining cash flow in terms of taxable income without adjustment for
capital appreciation).
23 5 Boris I. Bittker & Lawrence Lokkin, Federal Taxation of Income, Estates and Gifts,
& 135.4.3, at 135-66 to 135-67 (2d ed. 1993).
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stock value.24 The most important adjustments are for rights con-
veyed by corporate control: the ability to determine management,
distributions, and corporate structure.25 Because these rights permit
controlling shareholders to enrich themselves, either by entering into
favorable corporate contracts for goods and services or by tailoring
corporate investments to personal risk, income, and time horizons,
stock conveying control generally commands a premium. Conversely,
in recognition of the potential exploitation of minority shareholders,
stock lacking control generally26 receives a minority discount.2 7 Ap-
24 Id. at 135-28 (listing modifications for lack of marketability: abnormally large parcels,
tracts or holdings (blockage), premiums for control and discounts for minority status in
closely held enterprises, loss of a key executive, lack of diversification, especially in the
case of family companies, governmental restrictions and taxes on transfers or other trans-
actions involving the property, private restrictions and encumbrances, including buy-sell
agreements covering interests in closely held businesses); Cooper, note 4, at 196 (listing
discounts for blockage, unmarketability, minority interest, costs of flotation and sale, re-
strictions on disposition, and capital gains and other tax liabilities); Hitchner, note 16, at
476-78 (listing discounts for minority interest, lack of marketability, key man or thin man-
agement, investment company, information access and reliability, comparability, market
absorption and blockage, and liquidation andlor capital gains).
25 Ian R. Campbell, The Principles and Practice of Business Valuation 114 (1975)
(describing five valuable rights of corporate control: (1) the right to elect the board of
directors, which translates into control of the economic direction of the investment, (2) the
right to liquidate the company, which allows the shareholder to recoup asset value in the
event the company fails as a going concern, (3) the right to sell the company, which is the
ability to dictate the liquidity of the investment, (4) the right to appoint officers of the
company, which, if the compensation is excessive, results in drawing out profits that other-
wise would accrue to minority shareholders, and (5) the right to determine the amount and
timing of dividends, which is the benefit of determining the cash flow from the investment);
Pratt et al., note 17, at 301 (listing of powers and prerogatives of control: appointing man-
agement, determining management compensation and prerequisites, setting policy, acquir-
ing or liquidating assets, selecting supplies and awarding contracts, making acquisitions,
liquidating, dissolving, selling out or recapitalizing the company, selling or acquiring treas-
ury shares, registering the company's stock for a public offering, declaring and paying divi-
dends, and changing the articles of incorporation and bylaws); James R. Hitchner & Kevin
J. Rudd, The Use of Discounts in Estate and Gift Tax Valuations, Tr. & Est., Aug. 1992, at
49, 53 (controlling shareholder rights of electing directors, selecting management, deter-
mining dividend policy, establishing compensation and benefits, acquiring and liquidating
assets, selling the company, liquidating and dissolving the company, recapitalizing the com-
pany, acquiring or merging, revising the articles of incorporation and bylan, establishing
buy-sell agreements, and going public).
26 State law often disallows minority discounts in valuing stock in appraisal proceedings.
2 Principles of Corporate Governance: Analysis and Recommendations § 7.22(a) (1994)
(appraisal value determined without any discount for minority status). This disallowance is
based upon the purpose of the appraisal right rather than assumptions about market be-
havior. E.g., Cavalier Oil Corp. v. Harnett, 564 A.2d 1137, 1145 (Del. 1989) (-to fail to
accord to a minority interest the full proportionate value of his shares imposes a penalty
for lack of control, and unfairly enriches the majority shareholders who may reap a wind-
fall from the appraisal process by cashing out a dissenting shareholder, a clearly undesir-
able result").
27 Control often is regarded as involving a zero sum game. 5 Bittker & Lokken, note 23,
at 135-33 ("Control premiums and minority discounts can be regarded as mirror images, on
the theory that they reflect a division among the shareholders of a fixed amount (the value
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praisers usually increase the discount if management has broad lati-
tude,2 stock ownership is concentrated, 29 or corporate value is
small.30 Closely related to adjustments for control are those for mar-
ketability. Appraisers discount shares lacking a public market.
31
The type of adjustment depends upon the method used to value the
entire business.32 Thus, the market method already reflects the effect
of minority ownership.33 Asset value often takes into account lack of
marketability.34 Depending on how the discount rate is derived, the
income approach may reflect one or both discounts.
35
of the entire corporation) and that every dollar of extra value ascribed to the controlling
shares must therefore be offset by a minority discount."); Fellows & Painter, note 10, at
909-10 ("A minority discount... is a corollary of a majority premium and depends on the
latter for its validity. A discount for lack of control is only appropriate if the amount
discounted already includes a majority premium.").
In fact, control sometimes is a zero sum game and sometimes not. See generally 5 Bitt-
ker & Lokken, note 23, at 135-34 to 135-35 (noting that control premiums are attributable
both to the hope of operating the company more efficiently and the possibility of self deal-
ing); William Andrews, The Stockholder's Right to Equal Opportunity in the Sale of
Shares, 78 Harv. L. Rev. 505, 522-37 (1965) (discussing reasons for acquiring corporate
control); Henry G. Manne, Some Theoretical Aspects of Share Voting, 64 Colum. L. Rev.
1427, 1430 (1964) (identifying four reasons for seeking corporate control: monopoly
power, use of economies of scale, salaries and other perquisites, and improved
management).
For recent attempts to model the effect of lack of control upon the value of minority
shares, see Jerome S. Osteryoung, Donald A. Nast & William H. Wells, Pricing Minority
Discounts in Closely-Held Corporations, in Advances in Small Business Finance 19 (Ras-
soul Yazdipour, ed., 1991) [hereinafter Small Business Finance] (proposing option pricing
model for valuing agency costs incurred by minority shareholders); Zenichi Shishido, The
Fair Value of Minority Stock in Closely Held Corporations, 62 Fordham L. Rev. 65, 85-87
(1993) (determining minority discount and control premium by adjusting discounted cash
flow for risk of squeeze out, entrepreneurial rewards, and effect of dissatisfied minority
owners).
28 See Pratt et al., note 17, at 66.
29 Concentrated ownership increases the chance that controlling shareholders will ex-
ploit the minority. Hitchner & Rudd, note 25, at 53.
30 Small size means that the prerequisites claimed by controlling shareholders deplete a
larger percentage of corporate value. H. Calvin Coolidge, Fixing Value of Minority Inter-
est in a Business; Actual Sales Suggest Discount as High as 70%, 2 Est. Plan. 138, 141
(1975); Hitchner & Rudd, note 25, at 54-55 (describing evidence for an additional discount
for small companies).
31 See Bittker & Lokken, note 23, at 135-28 to 135-32.
32 See John A. Bogdanski, Federal Tax Valuation 4-117 to 4-118 (1996).
33 See Hitchner & Rudd, note 25, at 22 (if appraisal uses publicly traded stock data its
results are on a minority, marketable basis). But see Bittker & Lokken, note 23, at 135-42
(recognizing the possibility that minority interest in privately owned companies may be
"more disadvantageous than a minority position in the comparable public companies").
34 See Bittker & Lokken, note 23, at 135-29 (describing lack of marketability discount as
"an adjustment for the fact that the property being valued would be harder to sell than the
otherwise comparable property").
35 See id. at 135-30 ("When property is valued by capitalizing its anticipated net earn-
ings, no marketability discount is needed if the capitalization factor reflects not only the
earnings in isolation, but usually also the fact that the investor may find it difficult to liqui-
date the investment."); id. at 135-42 (capitalization rate drawn from public companic" t-
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Public markets supply the most important empirical evidence for
discounts. Appraisers find empirical evidence of control premiums
and minority discounts in two public market phenomena.36 One is the
premium paid to take over a public company? 7 Purchasers inevitably
pay more than the stock exchange price. The other source is the price
paid for shares in a closed-end mutual fund, an investment company
whose shares are not redeemable upon demand.38 The price of these
shares is usually less than the pro rata value of the underlying portfo-
lio.39 Appraisers support lack of marketability discounts by pointing
to the positive effect of an initial public offering on stock price and the
depressed price of nonregistered stock.
40
flects minority discount because transactions in public companies usually involve minority
shares).
36 One might try to substantiate discounts by pointing to Tobin's q, the ratio of the
market value of a company's debt and equity to the current replacement costs of its assets.
See James Tobin, A General Equilibrium Approach to Monetary Theory, 1 J. Money,
Credit & Banking 15,21 (1969). Although many firms have a q of less than one, there are
other explanations for a low q. See Reinier Kraakman, Taking Discounts Seriously- The
Implications of "Discounted" Share Prices as an Acquisition Motive, 88 Column L Rev.
891, 907-08 (1988).
37 See Lance S. Hall & Timothy C. Polacek, Strategies for Obtaining the Largest Valua-
tion Discounts, Est. Plan., Jan.-Feb. 1994, at 38, 42 (describing acquisitions of controlling
interests in the public marketplace as the primary source of data for discounts); J. Michael
Maher, An Objective Measure for a Discount for a Minority Interest and a Premium for a
Controlling Interest, 57 Taxes 449 (1979) (deriving an objective measure for a minority
discount from the cash premium offered in excess of the publicly traded market price of
minority interests in the same corporation); Shannon R. Pratt, Valuing a Minority Interest
in a Closely Held Company, Prac. Acct., June 19S6, at 60, 66-67.
38 See Whittemore v. Fitzpatrick, 127 F. Supp. 710, 720 (D. Conn. 1954) (relying on
experience of closed end investment trusts); Cooper, note 4, at 200 (describing deep dis-
counts in publicly traded closed-end investment companies as the justification for minority
discounts); Hall & Polacek, note 37, at 42 (real estate investment trusts compute their
discount by comparing the appraised value of their real estate holdings to the publicly
traded price of their shares) (citing Estate of Berg v. Commissioner, 61 T.C.M. (CCH) 279,
aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 92-2 USTC & 60,117 (8th Cir. 1992)); Hitchner & Rudd, note
25, at 55 (describing evidence of investment company discounts in real estate holding
companies).
39 There is also some data on the prices garnered on private sales. See Coolidge, note
30, at 138-41 (survey of difference between book value and price at private sales of closely
held companies).
40 See Milton Gelman, An Economist-Financial Analyst's Approach to Valuing Stock of
a Closely-Held Company, 36 J. Tax'n 353, 354 (1972) (determining lack of marketability
discount by reference to price differences between restricted and nonrestricted stock);
Hitchner & Rudd, note 25, at 50 (finding evidence of marketability discounts in price dif-
ferences between registered and unregistered stocks of the same company, in the compari-
son of closely held stocks with subsequent initial public offerings, in costs of flotation for a
public offering, and in court cases).
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B. Tax Reformers: Minority Discounts as Inconsistent With Likely
Family Behavior
Reformers criticize the allowance of minority discounts for transfer
tax purposes.41 They argue that discounts "erode" the estate tax
base 42 by imposing less tax on a lifetime gift than on a testamentary
bequest. A controlling shareholder who makes multiple gifts of small
blocks receives a minority discount, but one who makes testamentary
bequests to multiple beneficiaries does not.
4 3
This discrepancy alone does not necessarily undermine the allow-
ance of minority discounts. Different values may be appropriate for
gift and estate tax purposes if the discount reflects true diminution in
value. Thus, reformers usually supplement their base erosion argu-
ment with the claim that discounts do not reflect real diminution in
value because family members do not deal with each another at arm's
length."4 A family member is less likely to be hurt by, and may well
benefit from, corporate contracts and decisions regarding manage-
ment, distributions, and corporate structure. This means that the
value of a minority interest to a family member exceeds the price to
which a willing buyer and willing seller would agree. The retention
value of the minority interest exceeds its sale price.45
41 See, e.g., Stanley D. Neeleman, Kasner Disregards Sound Tax Policy, Says Professor,
61 Tax Notes 867 (Nov. 15 1993) ("The tax avoidance possibilities that derive from the
continued availability of discounts for transfers of fractional interests among family mem-
bers undermine the integrity of the transfer tax system and make a mockery of the princi-
ples of tax equity.").
42 See Cooper, note 4, at 197 (claiming that "valuation discounts have opened the door
to wholesale erosion of the estate tax base"); Dodge, note 10, at 254 (noting that current
valuation methods reduce tax base); Feld, note 10, at 946 (observing that minority dis-
counts "result in permanent avoidance of estate and gift tax"); Fellows & Painter, note 10,
at 899 (describing how controlling shareholders reduce estate and gift tax liability through
gratuitous transfers of minority blocks of controlling shares); Repetti, note 10, at 431-34
(describing use of valuation methods to reduce gift and estate taxes).
43 See Estate of Curry v. United States, 706 F.2d 1424, 1427 (7th Cir. 1983); Ahmanson
Foundation v. United States, 674 F.2d 761, 769 (9th Cir. 1981); David E. Watts, The Fair
Market Value of Actively Traded Securities, 30 Tax Law. 51, 71 (1976) (stating no argu-
ment for fragmentation even in the case of multiple specific bequests of the stock).
44 Cooper, note 4, at 197 (criticizing courts that allow valuation discounts for ignoring
the special family circumstances in which the valuation is being made); Dodge, note 10, at
255 n.54 ("Of course, in many... cases, the economic loss attributable to the creation of
minority interests is probably illusory, or else the transaction would not have been under-
taken in the first place."); Feld, note 10, at 943 (arguing against allowing minority discounts
for family businesses); Fellows & Painter, note 10, at 927-28 (noting that valuation does not
include de facto control by a group with sufficiently similar interests, even though such
control adds value).
45 Retention value usually equals sale price. Buyers pay the present value of benefits
accruing if the stock is retained. See text accompanying note 21. Sometimes, however,
stock price deviates from retention value. See Elliott Manning, Corporate Buy-Sell Agree-
ments 94 (1995) ("The price specified in a buy-sell agreement that permits gifts to family
members does not fix the gift tax value of shares transferred subject to the restrictive provi-
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Reformers approximate this retention value by assuming that the
family acts as a single unit. Family members are likely to manage the
company for mutual benefit and, when the time comes, to sell their
stock jointly for full value rather than separately for a discounted
amount. Accordingly, reformers argue that discrete transfers of stock
should be valued as part of the family-owned block.46 In Revenue
Ruling 81-253, the Service denied minority discounts for family-owned
companies by adopting such a "family attribution" rule.47
C. Courts: Minority Discounts as Objective Value
Notwithstanding the reformer critique, many claim that discounts
represent fair market value.48 This position has triumphed in the
courts, Congress, and the Service. In Estate of Bright,49 the Fifth Cir-
cuit affirmed that minority discounts were part of fair market value.
The Government argued that a discount for stock passing from wife to
husband was inappropriate because together they owned a majority of
the outstanding shares. The court rejected this argument, relying on
precedent, the willing-buyer, willing-seller standard, and the need for
stability and predictability.5 Citing the "hypothetical seller" language
in the regulations, it said that the fact that husband and wife together
owned a majority was irrelevant: "[Vialuation is based on a sale by a
hypothetical seller... who is related to no one."5'
Bright has been widely followed. The Ninth Circuit defended
Bright's objective standard as avoiding "the uncertainties that would
otherwise be inherent if the valuation methods attempted to account
for the likelihood that estates, legatees, or heirs would sell their inter-
sions of the agreement. The theory apparently is that the shares have a retention value as
well as a sale value."); Daniel S. Goldberg, Fair Market Value in the Tax Law Replace-
ment Value or Liquidation Value, 60 Tex. L Rev. 833, 846-52 (1982) (discussing the choice
between replacement value and liquidation value).
46 See Cooper, note 4, at 227, 231-32 (proposing that courts consider the relationship of
the donor to other shareholders); Fellovs & Painter, note 10, at 928 (describing proposal to
attribute ownership of voting shares by related family members and entities for valuation
purposes).
47 The ruling states:
[W]here a controlling interest in stock is owned by a family, the value per
share of the stock owned by one family member is the same as stock owned by
any other family member and is the same value that would exist if all the stock
were held by one person.
Rev. Rul. 81-253, 1981-2 C.B. 187, 188.
48 See, e.g., Thomas W. Dant, Jr., Courts Increasing Amount of Discount for a Minority
Interest in a Business, 43 J. Tax'n 104, 105 (1975); Robert E. Moroney, Most Courts Over-
value Closely Held Stocks, 51 Taxes 144, 156 (1973).
49 Estate of Bright v. United States, 658 F.2d 999 (5th Cir. 1981).
50 Id. at 1005-06.
51 Id. at 1007.
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ests together with others who hold undivided interests in the prop-
erty" and the "delicate inquiries into the feelings, attitudes, and
anticipated behavior of those holding undivided interests in the prop-
erty in question. '52 The Tax Court also adopted the Bright standard.
Refusing to "tailor 'hypothetical' so that the willing seller and willing
buyer were seen as the particular persons who would most likely un-
dertake the transaction," that court required "a truly hypothetical
willing seller and willing buyer. '53
In the wake of these decisions, both Congress and the Service
ceased challenging minority discounts. In 1987, Congress rejected a
proposal mandating family attribution within a single class of stock,
54
while enacting one addressing estate freeze transactions, codified at
§ 2036(c).55 The estate freeze proposal applied only to capital struc-
tures conferring preferred rights to income or control.5 6 In 1988, the
Service blessed certain minority discounts by exempting transfers of
nonvoting common stock from § 2036(c). 57 In replacing that subsec-
tion with special valuation rules in 1990, Congress disclaimed any ef-
fect on discounts.5 8 Finally, in 1993, the Service revoked Revenue
Ruling 81-25359 and ruled that it would not disallow a minority dis-
count solely because the family owns a controlling interest. 60
52 Propstra v. United States, 680 F.2d 1248, 1252 (9th Cir. 1982).
53 Estate of Andrews v. Commissioner, 79 T.C. 938, 956 (1982); see Ward v. Commis-
sioner, 87 T.C. 78, 106-08 (1986) (allowing minority discounts for gift tax purposes); Note,
Estate of Bright and Propstra: Rejection of Family Attribution in Estate Valuation, 2 Va.
Tax Rev. 357, 362-64 (1983).
54 The House bill would have provided that corporate stock was worth its pro rata value
within a single class and that stock held by a family would be voted together. These provi-
sions were not included in the conference bill. See H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 100-495, at 995
(1987), reprinted in 1987-3 C.B. 193, 275.
55 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-203, § 10402, 101 Stat.
1330, 431-32.
56 Chapter 14 likewise was limited. See IRC § 2701(a)(2)(B) (exempting situations in
which the transferor retains stock of the same class as the transferred stock).
57 Section 2036(c) included certain gifted stock in the transferor's estate. The Service
interpreted the provision as not applying if the donor gave away nonvoting common stock
while retaining voting common stock. See Notice 89-99, 1989-2 C.B. 422, at 428-29 (ex-
empting stock that differed only with respect to voting or managerial powers). Chapter 14
also exempted this transaction. IRC § 2701(a)(2)(C) (exempting situations in which the
transferor retains stock that is proportionally the same as the transferred stock, except for
either nonlapsing differences in voting power or, in a partnership, nonlapsing differences
with respect to management and limitations on liability).
58 Senate Finance Comm., 136 Cong. Rec. S15,681 (Oct. 18, 1990), reprinted in 1990-3
C.B. (vol. 3) S15681-4; see H.R. Rep. No. 101-964, at 1137 (1990).
59 Rev. Rul. 93-12, 1993-1 C.B. 202.
60 Id. at 203.
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D. Continuing Controversy
Notwithstanding these authoritative pronouncements, minority dis-
counts still spark controversy. Well after Bright,61 judges still ques-
tioned their use. Judge Richard Posner offered an extended analysis
of the economics of discounts and criticized Bright for its simplistic
disregard of likely behavior.62 Judge John Colvin of the Tax Court
went further and denied an estate a minority discount for a 49.65%
block of stock created by the transfer of an 88% interest 18 days
earlier.63
Moreover, despite its declared intentions, Congress disallowed
some discounts. Over the course of the estate freeze legislation, Con-
gress gradually adopted assumptions about family behavior similar to
those underlying minority discount reform.64 The final product,
Chapter 14, §§ 2701 through 2704 of the Code, undermines certain
minority discounts. Section 2701 cast doubt on discounts resulting
from the retention of voting preferred stock;65 §§ 2703 and 2704(b)
jeopardized discounts for entities for which liquidation value exceeds
going concern value;66 and § 2704(a) expressly taxes the value of cor-
61 Estate of Bright v. United States, 658 F.2d 999 (5th Cir. 1981).
62 Citizens Bank & Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 839 F.2d 1249, 1253 (7th Cir. 1988)
(describing Bright as "driven by an overmastering desire for simplicity, achieved by always
valuing a transfer as if the parties were strangers rather than members of the same family
or otherwise entangled in a web of relationships that might change the actual value of the
gift in either direction").
63 Estate of Murphy v. Commissioner, 60 T.C.M. (CCH) 672, 672 (1990); see Note, Mi-
nority Discounts in the Valuation of Closely Held Stock: Estate of Murphy v. Commis-
sioner, 45 Tax Law. 609 (1992).
64 The minority discount provision was based on doubts as to whether related parties
could have competing interests. H.R. Rep. No. 100-391, at 1042 (1987) ("The assignment
of a discount to minority ownership of an enterprise assumes that the owners of that enter-
prise have adverse interests. The committee believes that such an assumption is less defen-
sible ... when the owners are related."). The estate freeze provision, however, was
premised upon the analogy between an estate freeze and a retained life estate. Id. at 1042-
43. In explaining the retention of § 2036(c) in 1998, the committee report expressed con-
cern that the donor would not exercise retained rights in an arm's length manner. H.R.
Rep. No. 100-795, at 422-23 (1988). In replacing § 2036(c) in 1990, the Senate Explanation
accompanying the bill asserted that family members do not exercise rights -in an arm's
length manner." Senate Finance Committee, note 58, at S15681-1.
65 Section 2701 values a residual interest by subtracting the value of preferred stock
from the value of the entire company and by giving the preferred stock value only to the
extent of fixed rights to income. Reg. § 25.2701-3(b) (valuing gift by reducing the value of
the entire business by the retained interest). This procedure could eliminate the discount
attributable to the retention of voting preferred stock. Although the regulations accord
value to voting rights associated with stock with equal rights to distributions, see Reg.
§ 25.2701-3(b)(4)(ii) (allowing adjustment for interests of the same class), they make no
express adjustment for voting rights retained in conjunction with preferred rights to distri-
butions. See Howard M. Zaritsky & Ronald D. Aucutt, Structuring Estate Freezes Under
Chapter 14, at 2-32 to 2-34 (1993).
66 Sections 2703 and 2704(b) disregard restrictions depressing value in valuing estates.
IRC § 2703(a)(2) (disregarding restrictions on the right to sell or use property); IRC
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porate control passing through the lapse of voting or liquidation
rights.
67
Finally, despite withdrawing Revenue Ruling 81-253, the Service
still challenges minority discounts in unusual situations. In one techni-
cal advice memorandum, it valued three gifts of 30% interests to dif-
ferent children by considering "the swing vote potential," namely, the
possibility of joining with another block.68 In another, it limited the
discount for an undivided interest in real property to the estimated
cost of partition.69 In recent partnership regulations, it disallowed a
minority discount for a gift of an interest in a partnership that owned a
vacation home and was not engaged in "bona fide joint business
activities.
'70
III. MINORITY DISCOUNTS AND THE MARKET
Missing from the debate over minority discounts in taxation is a
coherent theory of corporate investment. 71 Appraisers do not elabo-
§ 2704(b) (disregarding restrictions on liquidation of a family controlled entity). This per-
mits the government to challenge minority discounts for entities in which liquidation value
exceeds going concern value by arguing that the corporate or partnership structure itself is
such a restriction. See T.A.M. 9723009 (Feb. 24, 1997); Note, Minority Interest Discounts
and the Effect of the Section 2704 Regulations, 45 Tax Law. 877 (1992).
67 This section creates a transfer equal to the decline in the donor's wealth. IRC
§ 2704(a); Reg. § 25.2704-1(d) (defining transfer amount as the excess of the value of all
interests owned by the holder immediately before the transfer over the value of such inter-
ests immediately after the lapse). This rule creates a gift equal to the difference between
the control premium enjoyed before the transfer and the minority discount enjoyed after,
Section 2704(a) is limited, however, to voting rights that are restricted or eliminated. Reg.
§ 25.2704-1(b), (c) (creating a lapse only when the voting or liquidation right is restricted
or eliminated). A controlling shareholder who transfers voting rights intact may still claim
a minority discount. The transfer of an interest that results in a lapse of a liquidation right
does not create a lapse under § 2704 if the rights with respect to the transferred interest are
not restricted or eliminated. Reg. § 25.2704-1(c). This rule exempts transfers of stock
when a family owns only a single class. Reg. § 25.2704-1(f)(Ex. 4). This treats a controlling
shareholder whose voting rights lapse as making a gift of corporate control.
68 T.A.M. 9436005 (May 26, 1994); see Steven A. Horowitz & Alfred A. Scope, IRS on
Minority Interest Discounts: It Don't Mean a Thing If It Still Got That Swing, 73 Taxes 76,
79 (1995).
69 See T.A.M. 9336002 (May 28, 1993); see Jerry A. Kasner, The IRS Still Doesn't Un-
derstand Valuation Principles, 61 Tax Notes 591, 592 (Nov. 1, 1993) (criticizing T.A.M.
9336002).
70 Reg. § 1.701-2(d) (Exs. 5, 6) (1995), T.D. 8588, 1995-1 C.B. 109, 115-16. These exam-
ples were later withdrawn. T.D. 8592, 1995-1 C.B. 119, 120. In the 1998 Budget, 'reasury
proposed eliminating valuation discounts except as they apply to active businesses. Inter-
ests in entities would be valued at a proportional share of net asset value to the extent that
the entity owns readily marketable assets. The reasonable working capital needs of an
active business would be treated as part of the business. Treasury Dep't, General Explana-
tion of the Administration's Revenue Proposals 129 (1998).
71 Bittker & Lokken, note 23, at 135-33 ("Although solidly embedded in practice, con-
trol premiums and minority discounts rest on vague and often contradictory theories of
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Tax Law Review
[Vol. 52:
MINORITY DISCOUNTS
rate upon how their procedure mimics the market. Reformers empha-
size the special circumstances of family-owned companies but do not
delineate how those circumstances affect price. Courts rely on objec-
five value, but fail to explain why discounts are objective. Fortu-
nately, the corporate finance literature contains extensive theoretical
discussion of discounts. That discussion undermines the positions
taken in the tax debate.
A. A Survey of the Corporate Finance Literature
Corporate finance discussions of minority discounts revolve around
the effort to fit empirical observations into a theory of the market.
The starting point for this effort is the efficient market hypothesis,72
which states that prices at any time fully reflect all available informa-
tion.73 Economists describe three levels of market efficiency: weak
efficiency, in which prices reflect all the information in the record of
past prices, semi-strong efficiency, in which prices reflect all other
published information, and strong efficiency, in which prices reflect all
information that could be acquired about the company and
economy.74
In its strong form, the efficient market hypothesis implies that stock
price approximates both asset value75 and expected cash flow.76 This
implication is a premise of the irrelevance theorem, which shows that
corporate investment."); see also Bogdanski, note 32, at 4-36 to 4.47 (surveying rationales
for discounts).
72 Michael C. Jensen, Some Anomalous Evidence Regarding Market Efficiency, 6 J. Fin.
Econ. 95, 95 (1978).
73 See Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical
Work, 25 J. Fmo. 383, 383 (1970); Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mecha-
nisms of Market Efficiency, 70 Va. L. Rev. 549, 554 (1984).
74 See Richard A. Brealey & Stewart C. Myers, Principles of Corporate Finance 295-96
(4th ed. 1991); Harry V. Roberts, Statistical Versus Clinical Prediction of the Stock Market
(unpublished paper presented to the Seminar on the Analysis of Security Prices, University
of Chicago, May 1967) (described in Brealey & Myers, supra, at 295 n.1).
75 Chang-Soo Kim, Investor Tax-Trading Opportunities and Discounts on Closed-End
Mutual Funds, 17 J. Fin. Res. 65 (1994) ("If capital markets are perfect, the market value
of assets should be equal to the value of the claims upon those assets."): Donald C.
Langevoort, Theories, Assumptions and Securities Regulation: Market Efficiency Revis-
ited, 140 U. Pa. L. Rev. 851, 851 n.1 (1992) ("In essence, the [efficient market] hypothesis
posits that there will be an identity of interest between two equilibria: securities prices and
asset values."); Kraakman, note 36, at 891 (describing the -common presumption in the
finance literature that informed securities prices credibly estimate the underlying value of
corporate assets").
76 Kraakman, note 36 at 898 ("Financial economics conventionally assumes that share
prices are best estimates, given available information, of the present value of expected
corporate cash flows available for distribution to shareholders."); William K.S. Wang,
Some Arguments That the Stock Market Is Not Efficient, 19 U.C. Davis L Rev. 341, 344
(1986) ("In a rational stock market, common stock prices should reflect the discounted
present value of future dividends and other payouts (using an appropriate discount rate.").
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managerial decisions to make distributions or issue stock do not affect
value.77 The strong form also implies that investors have homogene-
ous expectations, and that the demand for stocks is perfectly elastic,
that is, that investors will buy as much stock as is available at market
price. 7
8
It is difficult to reconcile the strong form of the efficient market
hypothesis with takeover premia 79 and discounts on closed-end
funds.8 0 Premia suggest a disparity between asset and stock prices,
whereas discounts demand it. Economists offer two explanations for
premia and discounts.8' The first is management. One variant of this
explanation focuses on agency costs. This variant attributes takeover
premia to improved management, 82 and closed-end fund discounts to
inflated salaries and perquisites.8 3 A more controversial variant
Economists relate return and risk in the capital asset pricing and arbitrage pricing models.
See Brealey & Myers, note 74, at 161-65.
77 Merton H. Miller & Franco Modigliani, Dividend Policy, Growth and the Valuation of
Shares, 35 J. Bus. 243 (1962) (stating dividend policy does not affect stock value in a per-
fect capital market); Franco Modigliani & Merton H. Miller, The Cost of Capital, Corpora-
tion Finance and the Theory of Investment, 48 Am. Econ. Rev. 261, 288-93 (1958)
(affirming that the value of the firm is unaffected by choice of capital structure).
78 See Lynn A. Stout, Are Takeover Premiums Really Premiums? Market Price, Fair
Value, and Corporate Law, 99 Yale L. J. 1235, 1239-244 (1990) [hereinafter Premiums]
(relating assumption of perfect elasticity to efficient market hypothesis and the capital as-
set pricing model); Lynn A. Stout, Are Stock Markets Costly Casinos? Disagreement,
Market Failure and Securities Regulation, 81 Va. L. Rev. 611, 651 (1995) [hereinafter
Casinos].
79 See, e.g., Bernard S. Black, Bidder Overpayment in Takeovers, 41 Stan. L. Rev. 597,
598 (1989) (describing takeover premia as "a continuing puzzle").
80 Kim, note 75, at 65 ("The discount phenomenon on closed-end mutual funds is a
puzzle to financial economists, since arbitrage activities should drive discounts to zero in a
perfect capital market."); Charles M.C. Lee, Andrei Shliefer & Richard H. Thaler, Investor
Sentiment and the Closed-End Fund Puzzle, 46 J. Fin. 75, 75 (1991) ("Few problems in
finance are as perplexing as the closed-end fund puzzle."); Burton G. Malkiel, The Valua-
tion of Closed-End Investment-Company Shares, 32 J. Fin. 847, 858 (1977) ("It would ap-
pear then that the pricing of closed-end investment-company shares does provide an
example of a market imperfection in the valuation of capital assets.").
81 See Kraakman, note 36, at 897-901 (describing misinvestment and market explana-
tions for discounts).
82 Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Corporate Control Transactions, 91 Yale
L.J. 698, 705 (1982) ("Corporate control transactions can reduce agency costs if better
managers obtain control of the firm's assets or if they alter the incentive structure facing
existing managers."). But see Black, note 79, at 633 (attributing premia to overpayment by
acquiring managers).
83 Michael J. Barclay, Clifford G. Holdemess & Jeffrey Pontiff, Private Benefits From
Block Ownership and Discounts on Closed-End Funds, 33 J. Fin. Econ. 263, 275-81 (1993)
(finding discounts correlated with managerial stock ownership and attributing this correla-
tion to private benefits received by management); Greggory A. Brauer, "Open-Ending"
Closed-End Funds, 13 J. Fin. Econ. 491, 496-99 (1984) (finding that managerial resistance
to open ending funds to be correlated with the fund's expense ratio); Stuart Rosenstein &
David F. Rush, The Stock Return Performance of Corporations That Are Partially Owned
by Other Corporations, 13 J. Fin. Res. 39, 50 (1990) (finding that partial ownership reduces
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points to the conflict between managers and shareholders over distri-
butions: Managers retain free cash flow within the corporation rather
than distributing it to shareholders. 4 By positing that distributions
affect share value, this variant contradicts the assumptions underlying
the irrelevance theorem.85
The empirical evidence indicates that firm management alone can-
not account for takeover premia or discounts on closed-end funds.
The size of the premia and discounts exceeds the benefits siphoned off
by managers. Shareholders lose far more than managers gain.86 Thus,
economists offer a second explanation, based upon clientele prefer-
ences, by which I mean, investor specific costs and benefits in the de-
mand for stocks. This explanation posits that investors evaluate
stocks differently87 and that discrepancies between stock and asset
prices reflect the preferences of differing clientele.88 The clientele
preference explanation emphasizes the role of synergys 9 and tax sav-
ings in acquisitions,90 factors that make the target more valuable to
the purchaser than to other investors. The clientele preference expla-
nation of closed-end fund discounts relies on divergent attitudes to-
risk adjusted return and attributing low return to intercorporate transactions favorable to
the partial owner); Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Mana-
gerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 4 J. Fin. Econ. 305,305-60 (1976)
(discussing financial compensation and perquisites); Ronald C. Lease, John J. McConnell
& Wayne H. Mikkelson, The Market Value of Control in Publicly-Traded Corporations, 1!
J. Flm. Econ. 439, 468 (1983) (finding that stock with superior voting rights trades at pre-
mium; attributing this premium to the potential for receiving incremental benefits).
84 Michael C. Jensen, Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Take-
overs, 76 Am. Econ. Rev. Papers & Proc. 323, 324-25 (1986) (explaining corporate take-
overs by excess cash flow available to corporate managers).
85 Richard A. Booth, Discounts and Other Mysteries of Corporate Finance, 79 Cal. L
Rev. 1055, 1070-77 (1991) [hereinafter Discounts]; Kraakman, note 36, at 914-20.
86 Kraakman, note 36, at 905 ("agency cost theories have difficulty explaining why the
past performance [of closed end funds] is only a modest predictor of discounts"); Malkiel,
note 80, at 855-56 (finding little correlation between size of discount on closed-end funds
and management fees and turnover).
87 See Stout, Premiums, note 78, at 1244-52 (arguing that investors have heterogeneous
beliefs); Stout, Casinos, note 78, at 625-35 (describing heterogeneous investor expectations
regarding performance); id. at 657-59 (describing different investor preferences for risk,
liquidity, and taxes).
88 See Booth, Discounts, note 85, at 1076 (linking discounts to heterogeneous investor
preferences).
89 Michael Bradley, Anand Desai & E. Han Kim, The Rationale Behind Interfirm
Tender Offers: Information or Synergy?, 11 J. Fin. Econ. 183, 204-06 (1983) (concluding
that takeover bids are attempts to exploit potential synergies).
90 See Alan J. Auerbach & David Reishus, Taxes and the Merger Decision, in Knights,
Raiders and Targets: The Impact of the Hostile Takeover 301 (John C. Coffee, Jr., Louis
Lowenstein & Susan Rose-Ackerman eds., 1988).
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wards taxes 9' and distributions,92 as well as a lack of marketing.93 By
positing heterogeneous preferences and elastic demand, 94 the clientele
preference explanation clashes with the traditional efficient market
hypothesis.
The management and clientele explanations are complementary. 95
Discounts reflect behavior both inside and outside a firm; managers
and investors alike tolerate deviation between asset value and stock
price. In the most ambitious account of closed-end funds to date,
Charles Lee, Andrei Shleifer, and Richard Thaler discuss both mana-
gerial behavior and clientele preference. They describe how self-in-
terested promoters and managers sell funds to naive investors, who
purchase fund shares only to see their price rapidly plummet.96 They
also describe how continuing discounts reflect prices offered by two
separate and distinct clienteles: the unsophisticated individuals who
buy shares in the funds and institutions who dominate the market for
the stocks in the funds' portfolios.
97
Responding to takeover premia, discounts on closed-end funds and
other market anomalies, some scholars revise the efficient market hy-
pothesis.98 Some claim only speculative (or informational) effi-
ciency-that security prices reflect financial returns on the securities,
and not allocative (or fundamental) efficiency-that stock prices mir-
91 Kim, note 75, at 74-75 (attributing part of discount to the loss of tax trading
opportunities).
92 Rex Thompson, The Information Content of Discounts and Premiums on Closed-End
Fund Shares, 6 J. Fin. Econ. 151, 181 (1978) (attributing discounts to overlapping clienteles
and "heterogeneous investor demands for attributes such as the timing, magnitude, and tax
status of shareholder distributions").
93 See Malkiel, note 80, at 857-58 (describing lack of broker enthusiasm for closed-end
funds); Eugene J. Pratt, Myths Associated With Closed-End Investment Company Dis-
counts, Fin. Anal. J., July-Aug 1966, at 79, 82 (attributing discount to a "lack of sales effort
and public understanding"). The variation in discounts over time also suggests the impor-
tance of "market psychology" in discounts. See Malkiel, note 80, at 857.
94 See Richard A. Booth, The Efficient Market, Portfolio Theory, and the Downward
Sloping Demand Hypothesis, 68 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1187, 1194-202 (1993) [hereinafter: De-
mand Hypothesis]; Andrei Shleifer, Do Demand Curves for Stocks Slope Down?, 41 J. Fin.
579, 580-88 (1986).
95 Booth, Discounts, note 85, at 1058 (arguing that both market and misinvestment ex-
planations are correct and are "nothing more than alternative formulations of the same
basic truth").
96 Lee et al., note 80, at 84, ("[Tjhere is no 'efficiency' reason for the existence of closed-
end funds. Like casinos and snake oil, closed-end funds are a device by which smart entre-
preneurs take advantage of a less sophisticated public.").
97 See id. at 82. But see Abraham Abraham, Don Elam & Alan J. Marcus, Abstract,
Does Sentiment Explain Closed-end Fund Discounts? Evidence From Bond Funds, 28
Fin. Rev. 607, 607 (1993) (arguing that investor sentiment does not completely explain
discounts).
98 See Langevoort, note 75, at 864-72; Booth, Demand Hypothesis, note 94, at 1190 n.6
(collecting authorities).
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Tax Law Review
MINORITY DISCOUNTS
ror economic returns on real assets.99 This revision salvages part of
the efficient market hypothesis by allowing stock prices to reflect
available information but not fundamental value. An investor still
cannot beat the stock market.
Another revision, known as noise theory, posits two distinct types
of traders. One type, consisting largely of individuals, is not fully ra-
tional, that is, its demand for stock is based on factors other than fun-
damentals. The other type, consisting mostly of institutions, is guided
by fundamentals but cannot assume the risk of long-term arbitrage
necessary to fully rationalize stock prices. The presence of these two
types of traders causes stock prices to deviate from asset value.t °°
Revisions in the efficient market hypothesis explain market anoma-
lies but dispense with a single unified market. Limiting the claim to
speculative efficiency severs financial markets from asset markets.
Noise theory, too, severs these markets by positing that irrational
traders skew the demand for stocks but not for assets.
The idea of multiple, segmented markets also emerges in explana-
tions of takeover premia and closed-end fund discounts. Louis Low-
enstein attributes takeover premia to separate markets for assets and
stocks.' 0' Likewise, accounts of closed-end funds discounts emphasize
the market segmentation created by barriers to entry. Rainier Kraak-
man, for example, roots the persistence of discounts in resistance by
corporate managers, potential competition from rival bidders, and ex-
pectations of target shareholders.102 Professors Lee, Shleifer, and
Thaler attribute the existence of discounted closed-end funds to arbi-
tragers' short-term investment horizons, managerial resistance, and
regulatory restrictions. 10 3
99 See Ian Ayres, Back to Basics: Regulating How Corporations Speak to the Market,
77 Va L. Rev. 945, 965-83 (1991); Jeffrey N. Gordon & Lewis A. Kornhauser, Efficient
Markets, Costly Information and Securities Research, 60 N.Y.U. L Rev. 761 786-96 (1985);
Wang, note 76, at 344-49. Some criticize the utility of this distinction. See Jonathan R.
Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Fraud-On-The-Market Theory Revisited, 77 Va L Rev.
1001, 1012-15 (1991).
100 For overviews of noise theory, see, e.g., Langevoort, note 75, at 866-72 Andrei
Shleifer & Lawrence H. Summers, The Noise Trader Approach to Finance, 4 J. Econ.
Persp., Spring 1990, at 19.
101 Louis Lowenstein, Pruning Deadwood in Hostile Takeovers: A Proposal for Legisla-
tion, 83 Colum. L. Rev. 249, 304 (1983) (arguing that institutional investors' focus on short-
term values is quite different from that of a potential acquiror describing more generally
the phenomena of different values for different markets and describing use of different
markets to value closely-held stocks); see also Louis Lowenstein, Management Buy Outs,
85 Colum. L. Rev. 730, 751-54 (1985) (describing asset and stock markets as consisting of
different sets of buyers).
102 Kraakman, note 36, at 920-25.
103 Lee et al., note 80, at 83 (describing why arbitragers cannot eliminate closed-end
fund discounts); see also Morris Mendelson, Closed-End Fund Discounts Revisited, Rm.
Rev., Spring, 1978, at 48, 67 (arguing that free riding discourages tender offers); Kim, note
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B. The Implications of the Corporate Finance Literature for the
Debate over Minority Discounts in Transfer Taxation
The corporate finance literature undermines the positions taken by
courts, reformers, and appraisers alike in the tax debate. First, that
literature refutes the judicial contention that an "objective" standard
of valuation requires the allowance of minority discounts. Both the
traditional efficient market hypothesis and its recent revisions contra-
dict this assertion. The efficient market hypothesis supports the exist-
ence of an "objective" standard, but denies the existence of discounts.
Rational investors pay pro rata value, and departures from that value
reflect subjective preferences. Adherents of efficient markets view
discounts as involving precisely the subjective inquiry into the "feel-
ings, attitudes and anticipated behavior"'10 4 disavowed by courts.10 5
Recent revisions of the efficient market hypothesis also deny minor-
ity discounts a role in valuation. Economists who claim only specula-
tive efficiency or adopt noise theory admit that discounts exist. They
do not, however, view discounts as objective. The stock and asset
markets reflect different assumptions. A discount simply reflects one
of two prices, established on different markets. The revised models
describe only the existence of discounted and undiscounted prices, not
the priority of one price over the other. Corporate stock is discounted
when bought on a stock exchange, but not when purchased in an ac-
quisition. Investment portfolios and real estate are discounted if
owned through a closed-end fund, but not if held directly.
Thus, even revisions in the efficient market hypothesis leave room
for disallowing discounts under the willing-buyer, willing-seller stan-
dard. Those revisions recognize all buyers and sellers as hypothetical;
the only question is what to hypothesize in a particular situation. A
hypothetical buyer and seller might arrive at a price that anticipates
sale to a third party who will pay for the benefit of control. 10 6 The
hypothetical buyer and seller might assume that a company will be
acquired and operated as a division, or liquidated and drained of its
assets.
75, at 75 (attributing continued existence of funds to market frictions such as free-rider
problems, short-sale restrictions, and the like).
104 See text accompanying note 53.
105 See Stout, note 78 (efficient markets hypothesis assumes homogeneous
expectations).
106 Citizens Bank & Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 839 F.2d 1249, 1255 (7th Cir. 1988)
(asserting that minority discounts might be disallowed "not because the court should have
tried to estimate the probability of the heirs' getting together and reassembling their fa-
ther's control bloc but because the .. shares should have been valued as if sold to a
hypothetical buyer, who would pay a premium for control"). Courts valuing stock for ap-
praisal purposes often dispense with minority discounts. Robert B. Heglar Note, Rejoicing
the Minority Discount, 1989 Duke L.J. 258, 260-61 (1989) (describing split in courts).
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At the same time, the literature offers little solace to reformers.
Shared familial interests may diminish agency costs and conflicts over
cash flow, but they do not eliminate them. Family members can still
differ over investment philosophy, risk, and distributions. Indeed,
family members usually have differing interests: The older generation
prefers a secure stream of current income, whereas the younger gener-
ation favors riskier capital accumulation. 0 7
Moreover, even if family ownership decreases transaction costs, it
does not necessarily result in a commensurate reduction in the size of
discounts. Investor preferences may still support large reductions
from pro rata value. Even slight transaction costs can give rise to sub-
stantial discounts. Accordingly, the clientele explanation for dis-
counts suggests that one cannot, as the Service attempted to do in its
technical advice memorandum, 08 limit the discount for an undivided
interest in real property to the costs of partition.
Finally, the corporate finance literature casts doubt on standard ap-
praisal methodology. Appraisers consider managerial behavior and
clientele preference in adjusting stock prices for control, but not in
determining total firm value. The result is a one-sided account in
which managerial behavior and clientele preference only diminish
value.
For example, the methods used to determine total firm value ignore
how managerial behavior, together with close holding and small size,
can enhance value. The selection of guideline public companies under
the market method fails to recognize how close holding reduces trans-
action costs'0 9 and improves profitability.1 0 The asset method sums
up the value of corporate assets and liabilities but ignores how the
existence of a firm reduces the cost of contracting."' By omitting un-
realized appreciation, the income method neglects the close alignment
107 Cf. Wilber G. Lewellen, Kenneth L. Stanley, Ronald C. Lease & Gary G.
Schlarbaum, Some Direct Evidence on the Dividend Clientele Phenomena, 33 J. Fn. 13S5,
1395-96 (1978) (describing how differing preferences for dividends affect stock price).
108 T.A.M. 9336002 (May 28, 1993).
109 Easterbrook & Fischel, note 82, at 706 (describing how going private eliminates or
substantially reduces agency costs and costs attributable to public ownership including sub-
stantial legal and auditing fees, stockholder relations costs and compliance with disclosure
obligations mandated by the SEC and organized stock exchanges); John C. Easterwood &
Ronald F. Singer, Are the Motivations for Leveraged Buyouts the Same for Large and
Small Firms, in Small Business Finance, note 27, at 79 (describing effect of buyouts on
transaction costs).
110 Louis De Alessi, Private Property and Dispersion of Ownership in Large Corpora-
tions, 28 J. Fm. 839 (1973); Easterbrook & Fschel, note 82, at 706 n.224 Mfron Stano,
Executive Ownership Interests and Corporate Performance, 42 S. Econ. J. 272 (1975).
M R. H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 Economica 386 (1937). reprinted in Ronald
H. Coase, The Firm, The Market and the Law 33 (1988) (describing the firm as a means of
lowering transaction costs); see generally Oliver E. WVilliamson & Sidney G. Winter, The
Nature of the Frm: Origins, Evolution, & Development (1991).
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of management and ownership in many small firms." 2 Unlike owners
of large firms, owners of small firms often have access to unrealized
appreciation and other value. Even though state law sometimes pro-
tects such access," 3 appraisers seldom consider it.
Similarly, appraisers omit how financing and capital structure en-
hance total firm value" 4 by tapping into different clientele. 15 The
interpolation of a corporate shell, for example, can increase price by
attracting investors who prefer owning stock. Some investors attach
independent value to attributes such as limited liability, ongoing con-
tracts, and "packaging. 11 6 Such investors account for the successful
public offering of closed-end mutual funds."
7
112 Ronald J. Gilson, Evaluating Dual Class Common Stock: The Relevance of Substi-
tutes, 73 Va. L. Rev. 807, 828 (1987) (arguing that small, growing companies experience
little conflict of interest between managers and shareholders); Easterwood & Singer, note
109, at 88 (concluding that small firm buyouts are more likely to be motivated by a desire
to reduce shareholder servicing costs and diminish owner-manager conflicts than buyouts
by larger firms).
113 Pedro v. Pedro, 489 N.W.2d 798 (Minn. App. 1992) (holding fiduciary duty owed
minority shareholders includes continued employment); Wilkes v. Springside Nursing
Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657(Mass. 1976) (same).
114 See, e.g., Brealey & Myers, note 74, at 412 (financing can affect firm value appealing
to unsatisfied clientele); Sudipto Bhattacharya, Corporate Finance and the Legacy of
Miller and Modigliani, J. Econ. Persp., Fall 1988, at 155 (arguing that an optimal debt-
equity mix exists).
115 Perhaps the best illustration of the clientele effect is the asset-backed securities mar-
ket. See Division of Investment Management, U.S. Securities & Exchange Comm'n, Pro-
tecting Investors: A Half Century of Investment Company Regulation 2 (1992)
(estimating that $292.8 billion of asset-backed securities were issued in 1991, representing
50% of all public security issuances). This market flourishes because corporations can re-
duce financing costs by issuing securities backed by mortgages and consumer debt. James
A. Rosenthal & Juan M. Ocampo, Analyzing the Economic Benefits of Securitized Credit,
J. Applied Corp. Fin., Fall 1988, at 32, 41 (concluding that General Motors Acceptance
Corporation saved up to 1.3% annually by securitizing its loan receivables). Although the
cash flow from that debt remains unchanged, the securitization allocates risk and return in
ways that better match clientele preferences. Steven L. Schwarcz, The Alchemy of Asset
Securitization, 1 Stan J.L. Bus. & Fin. 133, 151 (1994) (arguing that securitization of debt
into senior and subordinated securities reduces net financing costs by limiting the monitor-
ing costs to those most competent to perform such monitoring).
116 Some investor preferences are difficult to fathom. For example, investors apparently
sometimes prefer stock lacking voting rights. Several studies show that the price of non-
voting stock occasionally exceeds that of otherwise identical voting stock. Lease et al.,
note 83, at 466, 469 (observing that from 1940-1978, voting common stock sometimes
traded at a discount from nonvoting common stock in the same firm); Ronald C. Lease,
John J. McConnell & Wayne H. Mikkelson, The Market Value of Differential Voting
Rights in Closely Held Corporations, 57 J. Bus. 433, 451-56, 466 (1984) (finding that for
one publicly traded company the class of stock with superior voting rights traded at a dis-
count relative to the class with inferior rights); Haim Levy, Economic Evaluation of the
Voting Power of Common Stock, 38 J. Fin. 79 (1983) (finding that for three of twenty-five
stocks listed on Israeli stock exchange, voting common stock sometimes traded at a slight
discount from nonvoting common stock).
117 Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Structure of Corporation Law, 89 Colum. L. Rev. 1461,
1518 & n.255 (1989) (citing empirical study indicating that initial marketings of closed-end
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Appraisers probably omit the effect of managerial behavior and cli-
entele preference on total firm value because it is difficult to quantify.
This omission, however, understates value in obvious ways. For exam-
ple, under standard methodology, three investors can make equal cap-
ital contributions in a routine incorporation and each show a loss
equal to the minority discount.118 This "loss" results, however, solely
from excluding the effects of managerial behavior and clientele pref-
erence from the first step of the appraisal while considering them in
the second.
In the real world, incorporations occur only if they increase overall
value. Managerial behavior or clientele preference might explain such
increase. The cost savings of contracting within a firm may exceed the
agency costs of separating ownership from management. Alterna-
tively, investors may value shared control over pooled resources more
than exclusive dominion over some limited portion. The value added
by combining tracts of land, for instance, can exceed the agency cost
incurred by reason of joint ownership. In valuing closely held compa-
nies, however, appraisers do not consider these possibilities.
To take another example, standard appraisal methodology assumes
that privately traded companies are invariably worth less than public
comparables. Appraisers begin from public guideline companies and
adjust downward. 119 The first step uses data from public companies to
establish total firm value; it does not acknowledge the potential posi-
tive effect of private holding. Private holding becomes relevant only
in the second step, at which point it can only reduce value.
In the real world, however, at least some companies are more valua-
ble when traded privately.1 20 This is suggested by the failure to take
most companies public and the affirmative removal of some compa-
nies from public markets in going-private transactions.12 1 Again,
managerial behavior and clientele preferences might explain added
value. The costs of public trading may exceed the benefits, or inves-
funds reach a large pool of uninformed investors); see, e.g., John NV. Peavy ll, Returns on
Initial Public Offerings of Closed-End Funds, 3 Rev. Fin. Stud. 695, 695-707 (1990)
(describing average 10% premia on initial public offering of closed end funds).
11 Manning, note 45, at 64 (claiming that this result demonstrates a flaw in standard
valuation techniques).
119 The market and income methods both begin with data from public companies. See
text accompanying notes 16-23.
120 Harry DeAngelo, Linda DeAngelo & Edward M. Rice, Going Private: Minonty
Freezeouts and Stockholder Wealth, 27 J.L & Econ. 367 (1984) (concluding that going-
private transactions increased shareholder wealth); Easterbrook & Fischl, note 82, at 706
(noting that changes in a business or financial structure may make it worthwhile for a firm
to go private).
121 This is particularly likely for small companies with low agency costs. Booth, Dis-
counts, note 85, at 1208 (noting tendency of large corporation to acquire small, growing
companies and to operate them as captive subsidiaries).
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tors may value a company with concentrated holdings more than one
with widely disbursed stock. Appraisers, however, acknowledge
neither possibility.
C. The Irrelevance of Current Valuation Standards
The economic literature renders current valuation standards largely
irrelevant to the issue of minority discounts. That literature estab-
lishes that minority discounts cannot be understood in terms of fair
market value.122 There is no single market, only a choice among mul-
tiple markets. In allowing a discount, an appraiser decides that the
interest being valued is comparable either to stock in a corporation
that is not a takeover target or to shares in a closed-end investment
fund. In disallowing discounts, she decides that such interest is more
like stock in a takeover target or shares in an investment portfolio.
There is no established legal standard for choosing among markets.
The little authority that addresses this question12 3 is divided between
conflicting approaches. One alternative looks to the most visible mar-
ket. This approach underlies rules looking to the market on which the
item is "commonly sold to the public"'124 and using market quotations
without reduction for commissions.'25 This approach eases adminis-
tration by using the most readily ascertained price but at the expense
of obvious unfairness and inefficiency. It favors taxpayers with access
122 The economic literature casts a shadow beyond the minority discount issue. Some
scholars use revisions of the traditional efficient market hypothesis to argue against reli-
ance on fair market value in all circumstances. Stout, Premiums, note 78, at 1288 ("No
single shareholder's estimate can, on its face, be said to be more valid than any other's.
Market price is nothing more than the equilibrium intersection of a fixed supply function
with a downward sloping demand function at a point where the least optimistic of the
firm's current shareholders values her stock."); Booth, Discounts, note 85, at 1107 (criticiz-
ing the assumption of an objectively fair price for a share of stock).
123 Courts often deny that alternative markets exist. In United States v. Cartwright, 411
U.S. 546 (1972), for example, a majority of the Supreme Court valued shares in an open-
end mutual fund at their redemption price, that is, after sales charges, because that was the
only market. Id. at 552-53 ("[T]he only price that a shareholder may realize and that the
fund-the only buyer-will pay is the redemption price."). The majority ignored entirely
the market on which shareholders purchase their shares. Id. at 561 (Stewart, J., dissenting)
("[A] perfectly normal market of willing buyers and sellers does exist with respect to such
shares prior to their issuance.").
124 Reg. § 20.2031-1(b) ("Nor is the fair market value of an item of property to be deter-
mined by the sale of the item in a market other than that in which such item is commonly
sold to the public, taking into account the location of the item whenever appropriate.");
Lio v. Commissioner, 85 T.C. 56 (1985), affd sub nom., Orth v. Commissioner, 813 F.2d
837 (7th Cir. 1987).
125 Scott v. Hendricksen, 41-2 USTC (CCH) & 10,098 (W.D. Wash. 1941). This ap-
proach also may underlie the decision in Cartwright, 411 U.S. at 546, to value open-ended
funds based on redemption price. Although this price reflects commissions, it ;. u,'e s
newspapers to report fund value.
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to less visible markets and creates incentives to own assets with such
access.
The alternative looks to the market in which the actual owner
would sell the property.126 Thus, for example, although most goods
are valued on the retail market, 27 those owned by a manufacturer are
valued by reference to the wholesale market.'28 This approach cures
problems with fairness and efficiency but entails a costly inquiry into
probable behavior.
Not only is the authority on choosing among markets divided, it
also fails to address squarely the allowance of minority discounts. For
minority stock interests, it is simply unclear which market is more visi-
ble or likely to be used by the actual owner. For some companies,
particularly those whose stock is publicly traded, stock value is better
known; for others, such as investment companies, asset price is more
readily ascertained. Likewise, although most minority shareholders
participate only in the stock market, those belonging to a control
group also have access to the asset market.
IV. CULTURAL CONSTRUCTS AND h.I'ORITY DiscoUNTs
A. Concentrations of Wealth, Family Businesses, and
Popular Understandings
Thus, current law and policy do not provide a coherent framework
for understanding minority discounts. There is, however, a prospec-
tive that does. It draws from two concepts embedded in the larger
culture: concentrations of wealth and family businesses.12 9 Culturally
constructed, these concepts are like poles on a spectrum, distinct but
blurring as they converge. Concentrations of wealth are large, imper-
sonal, inactive, and selfish, whereas family businesses are small, per-
126 Reg. § 1.170A-1(c)(2)("[F]air market value is the price which the taxpayer would
have received if he had sold the contributed property in the usual market in which he
customarily sells."); Anselmo v. Commissioner, 80 T.C. 872, 882 (1983), affd, 757 F.2d
1208 (11th Cir. 1985) (valuing unset gems by reference to the jewelers' market); Trans-
america Corp. v. United States, 88-2 USTC (CCH) & 9501, at 85,404 (Cl. Ct. 198) (valu-
ing motion picture prints in the market created by dealers, libraries, and archives);
Jennings v. Commissioner, 56 T.C.M. (CCH) 595,600 (1988) (valuing artwork by reference
to auction market rather than primary or broad markets); Perdue v. Commissioner, 62
T.C.M. (CCI-) 845, 857 (1991) (valuing artifacts recovered from sunken galleon in auction
and museum shop markets rather than the numismatic market).
127 Reg. § 20.2031-1(b). For example, a used car is valued at the price at which a mem-
ber of the general public could purchase such car rather than the price at which dealers
would purchase it. Id; Skirpack v. Commissioner, 84 T.C. 285, 322 (1985) (valuing large
quantities of academic books in the retail market composed of university libraries).
1n Reg. § 1.170A-1(c)(2).
12 This Section summarizes a description contained in an earlier article. William Blart,
The American Dream in Legislation: The Role of Popular Symbols in Wealth Tax Policy,
51 Tax L. Rev. 287, 315-17 (1996).
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sonal, active, and altruistic. Concentrations of wealth pose obstacles
to the middle class hope of achieving the American dream; family
businesses embody that dream. These concepts surface in popular
classics such as Frank Capra's It's a Wonderful Life.130 In that film,
Mr. Potter, the town banker, is a classic symbol of the concentration of
wealth: a solitary, selfish old man. By contrast, the Bailey Savings
and Loan is a family business, born of the hard work of its founder
and committed to helping ordinary people. 13
1
These cultural constructs extend beyond mass entertainment. They
also dominate public debate over transfer taxes. Seeking popular
support, politicians and lobbyists use them to depict the object of
taxation. Proponents of the estate tax point to concentrations of
wealth. Presidents Theodore and Franklin Roosevelt railed against
"fortunes swollen beyond all healthy limits,"'132 "great accumula-
tions of wealth," and the transmissions of "vast fortunes. 1 33 Presi-
dent Hoover decried "frozen and inactive capital"' 34 and Andrew
Carnegie criticized "the millionaire's unworthy life.' 35 Critics of
the tax counter by evoking the family business. They argue that
the family business manifests the family,136 represents its founder's
130 It's a Wonderful Life (Liberty Films, Inc. 1946).
131 A family business may become a concentration of wealth in succeeding generations,
132 18 The Works of Theodore Roosevelt 578 (1925). Later, he wrote that very large
fortunes "are needless and useless, for they make no one really happy and increase no
one's usefulness, and furthermore they do infinite harm and they contain the threat of far
greater harm." Letter from Theodore Roosevelt to Jacob August Riis (Apr. 18, 1906), in 5
The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt 212 (Elting E. Morison ed., 1952).
133 H.R. Rep. No. 74-1681, at 2 (1935), reprinted in 1939-1 C.B. (vol. 4) 642, 643 (quot-
ing letter from Franklin Roosevelt, President of the United States, to the Congress of the
United States (June 19, 1935)). See Hearings on Internal Revenue Revision Before the
House Comm. on Ways & Means, 67th Cong. 224, 225 (1921) (statement of C. William
Ramseyer) (quoting Andrew Carnegie).
134 Herbert Hoover, The Memoirs of Herbert Hoover 29 (1952).
135 Andrew Carnegie, The Gospel of Wealth and Other Timely Essays 22 (Edward C.
Kirkland ed., 1962).
136 Discussion Draft Relating to Estate Valuation Freezes: Hearing Before the House
Comm. on Ways and Means, 101st Cong. 241-43 (1990) [hereinafter Discussion Draft
Hearing] (statement of Gerald 0. Haviland, family business consultant) ("These businesses
are not just enterprises. They are also manifestations of family values and family be-
liefs .... The business represents the values, the hopes and heritage of a family system.
Husbands, wives, sons, daughters, brothers and sisters all working together for a common
dream.").
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hard work,137 and performs altruistic service to the com-
munity.1 38
The cultural constructions underlie public intuitions about the abu-
siveness of transactions fragmenting property. Reformers link frag-
mentation to the transfer of concentrations of wealth.13 9 Claims that
transactions fragmenting property constitute "tax avoidance" and sus-
pect "estate planning," 14 connote the transfer of preexisting wealth
between generations. Defenders of discounts counter by linking frag-
mentation to family businesses.14' They assume that divided owner-
ship is part of joint business activity undertaken to produce wealth.
B. Cultural Constructions in Transfer Tax Law
Recognizing the tremendous power cultural constructions exert in
the public mind, most tax experts nonetheless exclude them from seri-
ous discussion of the tax base. They find the concentration of wealth
and family business constructs too fuzzy to use at that level of detail.
Tax experts prefer greater precision. Concepts like fair market value
provide the determinacy implicit in the rule of law. By distinguishing
the tax base from tax rates, experts can design taxes without discuss-
ing wealth redistribution.
As the minority discount question demonstrates, however, some is-
sues fall outside expert vocabulary. For such issues, cultural construc-
137 See, e.g., Revenue Revision, 1925: Hearings Before the House Comm. on Ways and
Means, 69th Cong. 328 (1925) (statement of State Sen. W.S. Baird) ("We want to help the
individual who is willing to advance his money and take his chances in the enterprises of
the country..., we want him to have the result of his enterprise himself. We do not want
somebody else after he is dead to come in and take it away through any subterfuge
whatever."); Proposed Taxation of Individual and Corporate Incomes, Inheritances and
Gifts: Hearing Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 74th Cong. 275,279 (1935)
(statement of Roy C. Osgood, U.S. Chamber of Commerce) ("To the extent that the desire
to assure continuance in a family of the possession and development of a going business is
a strong inducement to the hard application of energy and prudent administration of af-
fairs, the knowledge that estate and inheritance taxes will defeat such a purpose would
mean inevitably a lessening of incentive on the part of men of ability.").
Im See Discussion Draft Hearing, note 136, at 285-86 (statement of James H. Woody,
Union Tel. Co.) ("We also employ nearly 30 others from the local community..., [Ile
have made a commitment to our customers and community.").
139 George Cooper, for example, highlights how wealthy families such as the du Ponts
used minority discounts to avoid the transfer tax over generations. Cooper, note 4, at 199.
140 Cooper, note 4, at 197 (describing valuation discounts as "an estate planner's
dream"); Dodge, note 10, at 254 (alluding to "widespread use of carving minority interests
out of [property] in order to claim minority interest discounts for gift and estate tax
purposes").
141 Cf. Kasner, note 69, at 592 (arguing that IRS efforts to tax minority discounts -are
substantive changes that seriously affect closely held and family businesses"); Baker &
Botts Opposes Changes to Estate Tax Valuation Rules Taxing the Minority Discount of a
Close Corporation, 37 Tax Notes 285 (Nov. 9, 1987) (arguing that the 1987 house bill
"would have a profound adverse affect on family-owned businesses and family farms").
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tions unconsciously come into play. Although fuzzy, the constructs
constitute a common cognitive lens through which people see the
world. They inevitably influence assumptions about plausible behav-
ior and moral intuitions about legal rules. Concentrations of wealth
connote a monolithic, single actor, whereas family businesses suggest
multiple, independent agents. Taxation of concentrations of wealth is
praiseworthy; taxation of family businesses is troubling.
These assumptions permeate the estate taxation of closely owned
entities. They are obvious in special estate tax relief provisions142 lim-
ited to small, 143 active businesses 144 that involve family members per-
sonally. 45 They are also evident in the rules including property in the
gross estate, which apply to property subject to a retained income in-
terest but not to undivided interests in property or corporate stock. t 46
Because the retained income interest involves sequential ownership of
passive assets, it evokes concentrations of wealth. The inclusion rule
reflects the assumption that life estates and remainders are a single
property owned by one person147 and a willingness to impose higher
taxes on arrangements resembling concentrations of wealth.1 48
142 The transfer tax contains three relief provisions for family businesses. Section 2032A
provides special use valuation for certain real property. Section 2033A creates an exclu-
sion for family-owned business. Section 6166 grants an extension in time of payment for
interests in closely held businesses.
143 The special valuation benefit is limited to $750,000 plus an inflation adjustment for
estates after 1998, IRC § 2032A(a), the exclusion for family-owned businesses is limited to
$1.3 million, IRC § 2033A(a)(2), and a special 2% interest rate on the deferral benefit is
limited to the tax on $1 million, IRC §§ 6166, 66010)(2).
144 IRC § 2032A(b)(2) (requiring land to be used in a business); § 2033A(e)(2)(D) (de-
nying exclusion to portion of business attributable to passive assets); § 6166(b)(9) (denying
deferral to companies holding "passive assets").
145 IRC § 2032A(c)(1)(B), (c)(6)(B)(ii) (requiring heirs to materially participate in man-
agement of the farm or business); § 2033A(f)(1)(A) (imposing similar requirements).
146 See Estate of Boykin v. Commissioner, 53 T.C.M. (CCH) 345 (1987) (holding that
preferred stock and common stock are separate properties for purposes of § 2036(a)).
147 A similar line is drawn in the income tax, in which a life tenant and remainderman
are often treated as one person. A life tenant is taxed on all income from gifted property
and the remainderman is taxed on none. The life tenant receives no deduction for amorti-
zation, IRC § 273, and her basis jumps to the remainderman, Reg. § 1.1001-1(e). IRC
§ 167(e) disallows an amortization deduction for certain term interests in property. See
generally Kenneth F. Joyce & Louis A. Del Cotto, The AB (ABC) and BA Transactions:
An Economic and Tax Analysis of Reserved and Carved Out Income Interests, 31 Tax L.
Rev. 121 (1976); Jeffrey L. Kwall, The Income Tax Consequences of Sales of Present Inter-
ests and Future Interests: Distinguishing Time From Space, 49 Ohio St. L.J. 1 (1988). In-
terestingly, this principle does not apply to a corporate bond. IRC § 1286 (treating each
stripped coupon as a separate original issue discount bond).
148 Unlike most other transfers, gifts of remainder interests are taxed twice. Once, when
the gift is made, and again when the entire property is included in the gross estate. Fur-
thermore, the present value of the transfer tax is higher than it would be if the entire
property had been transferred by bequest because the gift tax is paid prior to death and no
adjustment is made for the government's use of the money prior to death.
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Tax Law Review
[Vol. 52:
MINORITY DISCOUNTS
The cultural constructs also affect the valuation of fragmented prop-
erty. Assets in corporate solution, for example, are valued more fa-
vorably than those outside a corporation. Transfers of corporate stock
routinely receive a discount and are valued without regard to stock-
holders' other holdings.149 By contrast, transfers of passive real prop-
erty receive fewer and smaller discountsuo0 and are more likely to be
valued in conjunction with other property.'5 1 By assigning less value
to incorporated assets, appraisers assume that managerial behavior
only reduces value. As demonstrated above, however, incorporation
need not have that effect.'52 The effect of incorporation upon value
depends upon the governing market. The solicitude accorded incor-
porated enterprises makes sense, however, as a sympathetic reaction
to the family business. 5 3 Corporations evoke business activities and
direct ownership connotes passive wealth accumulation.154
The influence of cultural constructs upon transfer tax valuation is
also evident in rules governing the valuation of entitlements that vary
over time. Split temporal interests in property, for example, are disfa-
vored. The Code and regulations have long disallowed discounts in
valuing life estates and remainders. 155 In contrast, undivided interests
149 5 Bittker & Lokken, note 23, at 135-12 (courts apply minority discount without any
consideration of [the value of corporate stock] to shareholders seeking dominance or abso-
lute control.").
150 See Anna C. Fowler, Valuation of Undivided Interests in Realty. When Do the Parts
Sum to Less Than the Whole?, 13 J. Real Estate Tax'n 123, 130 (1986) (noting that 11 of 29
cases denied discounts for transfers of undivided interests in property). The size of the
discount is also smaller. Id. at 150 (describing 15% discount as the median; 25% discount
as high).
151 Some courts consider the possibility of assembling real property into a larger tract.
See, e.g., Estate of Freiders v. Commissioner, 40 T.CM. (CCH) 403, 408 (1980), aftd, 6S7
F.2d 224,227 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1011 (1983). In addition, the valuation
of real property by reference to its "highest and best use" allows inquiry into the effect of
neighboring property upon value. See Lewis v. United States, 71-1 USTC & 12,739 (D.
Wyo. 1970) (valuing land used as farm as residential property for estate tax purposes);
Frazee v. Commissioner, 98 T.C. 554 (1992) (same).
152 See text accompanying note 114-17.
153 There is also a tendency to value corporations with operating businesses more favor-
ably than those with passive holdings. Compare Citizens Bank & Trust Co. v. Commis-
sioner, 839 F.2d 1249, 1252 (7th Cir. 1988) (expressing concern for "facile avoidance of gift
or estate tax"), and Estate of Murphy v. Commissioner, 60 T.C.M. (CCH) 645, 659-66
(1990) (disallowing discount for tax motivated transactions), with Estate of Newhouse, 94
T.C. 193, 247-52 (allowing a huge discount to corporation actively managed by family).
See also Reg. § 1.701-2(d) (Exs. 5, 6)(1995), T.D. 8588, 1995-1 CB. 109, 115-16 (disallow-
ing minority discounts for those not engaged in a bona fide joint venture). These examples
were later withdrawn. T.D. 8592, 1995-1 C.B. 119, 120.
154 For other situations in which the tax law rewards activity, see, e.g., RC § 469 (deny-
ing deductions for passive activities); §§ 541-547 (imposing additional tax on personal hold-
ing companies).
155 A life estate is valued under actuarial tables issued by the Service, and a remainder is
valued by subtracting the value of the life estate from the value of the whole property.
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in real property owned by tenants in common often receive a dis-
count.15 6 Thus, the law values life estates and remainders by reference
to a different market than that used for other property. It presumes
that life tenants and remaindermen, unlike tenants in common, sell
their interests together. This presumption runs contrary to likely fair
market value.' 5 7 Less liquid than cotenancies, life estates and remain-
ders would likely carry a greater discount on real markets. Use of a
different rule for them is based on their resemblance to concentrations
of wealth. Retention of lifetime enjoyment evokes estate planning be-
tween generations rather than an ongoing joint entrepreneurship
among them.
Similarly, throughout the estate freeze legislation of the 1980's, cap-
ital structures granting preferential rights to income fared worse than
those creating pro rata rights. Congress rejected family attribution for
minority discounts and excluded corporations with a single class of
stock from § 2036(c) and chapter 14.158 Again, concentrations of
wealth and family businesses explain this treatment. The resemblance
of the preferred stock freeze to a retained life estate and the term
"estate freeze" itself conjure up concentrations of wealth. In contrast,
proposals that disallow minority discounts evoke family businesses.'5 9
Neither interest is reduced for minority ownership or lack of marketability. IRC § 7520;
Reg. §§ 20.2031-7, 25.2512-5.
156 See note 150. Joint tenants with rights of survivorship do not receive a discount. See
Bogdanski, note 32, at 5-17 to 5-20.
157 Commentators argue that this approach is inconsistent with the willing-buyer, will-
ing-seller standard. See 5 Bittker & Lokken, note 23, 135.4.10, at 135-82 ("The willing-
seller, willing-buyer standard has never been applied directly to private annuities, life es-
tates, terms of years, remainders, reversions, and similar split interests in property, proba-
bly because such interests are rarely sold at arm's length."). At least, it represents a
different understanding of that standard than that applied to corporate stock. See O'Reilly
v. Commissioner, 973 F.2d 1403, 1407-09 (8th Cir. 1992) (arguing tables approximate the
result that would be reached under the willing-buyer, willing-seller standard, though the
tables will not be used when they produce unreasonable results); Palfrey v. United States,
36 F. Supp. 153, 156 (D. Mass. 1940) (upholding reliance on tables, notwithstanding the
lack of actual sales of similar property); Raimondi v. Commissioner, 29 T.C.M. (CCH) 70,
72 (1970) (rejecting argument that remainder interests are valueless under the willing-
buyer, willing-seller standard because they are rarely sold; "if a willing buyer and willing
seller could be found, they would value decedent's interests in very much the same fashion
as provided" in the regulations.").
158 See text accompanying notes 53-55.
159 See Richard L. Dees, Section 2036(c): The Monster That Ate Estate Planning and
Installment Sales, Buy-Sells, Options, Employment Contracts and Leases, 66 Taxes 876,
876 (1988) (describing the 1987 conference decision "as a fair compromise, as the discount
provision was perceived as affecting many more family businesses than the preferred stock
limitation.").
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V. CONCENTRATIONS OF WEALTH, FAMILY BUSINESSES, A'D
PROPOSALS ADDRESSING MINORITY DISCOUNTS
To sum up, legal doctrine formally determines value by reference to
fair market value. There is, however, no single market by which to
measure a minority discount. Minority discounts only appear if there
is more than one market, and if they do, it is uncertain which market
governs for tax purposes. At this juncture, cultural constructs color
the legal answer. These constructs make discounts seem more appro-
priate for entities resembling family businesses than for arrangements
evoking concentrations of wealth.
This reliance upon cultural constructions has been largely uncon-
scious. At least where fair market value proves indeterminant, how-
ever, tax experts should raise the unconscious to the conscious by
relying on cultural constructs in formulating tax proposals.'6 The
critical role played by cultural constructions in the political debate
demonstrates that they resonate with majoritarian preferences. Ex-
pert vocabulary expresses those preferences as well,16' but when gaps
appear in that vocabulary, theorists can use cultural constructs as best
evidence of majority will.
This does not mean that cultural constructs can supplant legal doc-
trine or traditional tax policy analysis. Standing alone, the constructs
do not generate blueprints for a tax system. Most would not tolerate a
system that simply taxed "concentrations of wealth" but not "family
businesses" without further elaboration. The rule of law requires the
development of an administrable standard, such as fair market value,
that distinguishes between these constructs. The underlying cultural
constructions however, can still inform application of that standard.
Thus, they can guide the development of appropriate rules for deter-
mining fair market value.
The constructs provide a fresh perspective on the reform of minor-
ity discounts. So far, reformers have focused on attributing stock
160 See Michael Livingston, Risky Business: Economics. Culture and the Taxation of
High-Risk Activities, 48 Tax L Rev. 163, 231 (1993) ("Academics... should be prepared
to debate culture as well as economics, applying the same rigor and skepticism in one area
that they would apply in the other."); Edward J. McCaffery, Cognitive Theory and Tax, 41
UCLA L. Rev. 1861, 1947 (1994) (describing the possibility of -a general, comprehensive
theory of tax, that can unite the diverse insights of law, psychology, economics, philosophy,
and other disciplines in a manner that can help us analyze and understand existent tax
systems and prescribe new ones.").
161 Expert vocabulary does not, however, capture all popular preferences. I have argued
elsewhere that tax theorists should use cultural constructs as a source of policy norms and
as a means of evaluating existing norms. See Blatt, note 129. at 330. Such use might lead
to tax rules deliberately designed to reward hard work and encourage community. Id. at
332-36. One need not subscribe to that project to use cultural constructs in the more mod-
est way described here.
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ownership among family members or taxing disguised transfers occur-
ring through the exercise or nonexercise of retained rights.162 The
concentration of wealth and family business constructions suggest that
reform efforts are better directed elsewhere. The cultural constructs
indicate less resistance to aggregating multiple transfers, and positive
support for presuming that a minority interest is worth at least its pro
rata share of the value of corporate assets if sold in liquidation.
A. Attributing Stock Ownership Among Family Members
The cultural constructs suggest stiff resistance to the proposal that
has dominated the reform agenda to date: the attribution of stock
ownership among family members. 163 This proposal assumes that
family members act as a single unit. A natural response to rejection of
prior versions of this proposal' 64 is to narrow the definition of "fam-
ily" to those most likely to cooperate, 165 perhaps by excluding sib-
lings.166 Stories dating back to the biblical account of Cain and Abel
attest to the pervasive enmity that exists among siblings.
67
In the abstract, family attribution seems appealing. Many Code
provisions attribute ownership among family members. 68 The cul-
162 See Section IV. A & B.
163 Rev. Rul. 81-253, 1981-2 C.B. 187, 188; H.R. Rep. No. 100-391, note 64, at 1043;
Cooper, note 4, at 227, 231-32; Fellows & Painter, note 10, at 928.
164 Revenue Ruling 81-253, 1981-2 C.B. 187, did not limit or define the term and the
1987 House Bill encompassed collateral relatives. See H.R. Rep. No. 100-391, note 64, at
1043 (defining family as "an individual's spouse, any lineal descendent of such individual or
of such individual's spouse, any parent or grandparent of such individual, and any spouse
of any of the foregoing").
165 See Comments on Estate and Gift Tax Revenue Increases, attached to Letter of
Charles W. Hall to David H. Brockway (Nov. 19, 1987) ("[To attribute the stock owned by
a sibling of an individual is too broad.... One of the most common sources of conflict in
closely held businesses is rivalry between the children of the founder of the business."),
reprinted in ABA Members Criticize Proposed Estate and Gift Tax Changes as Short-
sighted and Burdensome, 87 TNT 230-59, Nov. 30, 1987, available in LEXIS, Fedtax Li-
brary, TNT File.
166 See, e.g., IRC § 318 (attribution rule based on lineal descendants). For an even nar-
rower attribution rule, see Treasury I, note 10, at 386-87 (proposal to value gift as equal to
pro rata value of total interests owned by the transferor and transferee). Chapter 14 uses a
mix of rules. Compare IRC § 2701(a), (e) (attributing ownership to lineal descendants),
with § 2704 (attributing ownership to siblings), and § 2702(a), (e) (applying to transfers to
siblings but attributing only stock owned by lineal descendants).
167 For a self conscious account of the cultural dimensions of family attribution, see
Metzger Trust v. Commissioner, 693 F.2d 459, 460 (5th Cir. 1982) ("We decide today a
story driven by tensions as old as Genesis but told in the modem lexicon of the tax law. It
is the story of David who built a business and left it in the charge of his eldest son Jacob to
be shared with Jacob's two sisters Catherine and Cecelia, of the alienation and resulting
quarrel with the tax collectors.").
163 See generally Glenn E. Coven, The Affinity Provisions of the Internal Revenue
Code: A Case Study in Nonsimplification, 45 Tenn. L. Rev. 557 (1978).
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tural constructions, however, suggest that family attribution in the
transfer tax is controversial. The family business is part of the Ameri-
can Dream. Family attribution burdens family businesses by increas-
ing the cost of their transfer. In addition, family attribution
"penalizes" gifts to family members by taxing those transfers more
heavily than transfers to unrelated persons.
Current law confirms that family attribution for transfer taxation is
problematic. Historically, family attribution was confined to the in-
come tax, which excludes gratuitous transfers. 169 When used, attribu-
tion was reserved largely for "nonproductive" transactions such as loss
sales between related taxpayers,170 and corporate redemptions,
17 '
which shrink the business. Much of the controversy surrounding the
estate freeze legislation derived from its reliance on attribution.1 '- As
finally revised, that legislation used family attribution only for split
temporal interests and other arrangements evocative of concentra-
tions of wealth.173
Thus, any family attribution rule that flatly eliminates minority dis-
counts will likely encounter stiff resistance. Case law suggests that
even narrowed attribution has little appeal. In Estate of Bright, the
Fifth Circuit refused to attribute stock even between husband and
wife. 74 Ironically, narrowed attribution may be even less palatable,
because it would target the closest relationships, most central to the
family business. It would tax a gift to a son more heavily than one to
an uncle or cousin.
B. Taxing Disguised Transfers Occurring Through the Exercise or
Nonexercise of Retained Rights
The cultural constructs also reveal strong resistance to approaches
that tax transfers occurring when related persons do not deal with
each other at arm's length.175 These approaches would tax the excess
of the retention value of the stock over its arm's length price. They
would do so by taxing disguised transfers occurring through the con-
169 IRC § 102(a).
170 See IRC § 267.
171 See IRC §§ 302(b), 318.
172 See text accompanying notes 54-61.
173 Two provisions in chapter 14 applied to split temporal arrangements. IRC §§ 2701,
2702 (valuation rules for corporations and trusts). "Fie other two were limited to narrow
tax abuse situations. IRC § 2703 (disregarding restrictions not comparable to those en-
tered into in arm's length transactions); § 2704 (rules governing lapsing rights and certain
restrictions on liquidation).
174 Estate of Bright v. United States, 658 F.2d 999, 1003 (5th Cir. 1981).
175 See text accompanying notes 53-69 (describing alternatives enacted for estate
freezes).
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Tax Law Review
1997]
258 TAX LAW REVIEW [Vol. 52:
trolling shareholder's exercise or nonexercise of retained rights. By
failing to oppress the minority as assumed in the willing-buyer, will-
ing-seller standard, the controlling shareholder diverts value to the
minority.
Theoretically, the exercise or nonexercise of a retained right may
result in an immediate taxable gift. For example, after years of litiga-
tion,176 it is now clear that the failure to charge interest on a loan
results in a taxable gift of forgone interest, determined by reference to
the treasury bill rate. 77 The failure to exercise other rights, however,
can be far more difficult to detect and to value.'78 To catch these
hard-to-detect transfers, one can shift the event giving rise to a taxable
transfer. 7 9 The alternatives are a hard-to-complete rule and an easy-
to-complete rule, 80 variations of which were enacted for estate
freezes.
The hard-to-complete rule postpones taxation until the last event,
which is often death. This approach offers more accurate valuation
because it waits until all information is available.181 Section 2036(c)
approximated this result for estate freeze transactions by including the
176 See, e.g., Dean v. Commissioner, 35 T.C. 1083, 1090 (1961) (holding that failure to
charge interest did not result in taxable gift).
177 IRC § 7872; Dickman v. Commissioner, 465 U.S. 330 (1984) (holding that interest-
free demand loan resulted in transfer for federal gift tax purposes).
178 See William F. Nelson & Peter J. Genz, New Uncertainties in the Equity Freeze: The
Impact of Dickman on Capital Call Rights and Other Issues, 63 Taxes 999, 1015 (1985)
(arguing that failure to exercise rights to put or call corporate capital does not give rise to a
taxable gift).
179 Altering gift completion does not dramatically change the present value taxed. See
Alvin Warren, The Timing of Taxes, 39 Nat'l Tax J. 499, 499 (1987) ("The present value to a
taxpayer of a consistently defined tax will be the same whether the tax is deferred or accel-
erated, as long as the tax rate remains constant and the base of a deferred tax increases
over time by the rate of return generally applicable to investment of proceeds available
after payment of an accelerated tax."); Harry L. Gutman, A Comment on the ABA Tax
Section Task Force Report on Transfer Tax Restructuring, 41 Tax Law. 653, 655 (1988)
(Warren's "principle tells us that if a transfer is to be taxed at the same rate now or later,
and other conditions remain constant, we can be indifferent as to when the transfer is
treated as complete.").
Because estate and gift taxes are defined inconsistently, deferral or acceleration affects
present value, tax exclusivity, and the like. Other features favoring lifetime gifts are the
time value of the rate brackets and unified credit, see Gutman, supra, at 665, and the
$10,000 per donee annual gift tax exclusion. IRC § 2503(b).
180 For further description of the choice between hard-to-complete and easy-to-complete
rules, see ALl, Federal Estate and Gift Tax Project 42-48 (1968).
181 See Dodge, note 10, at 244 (advocating using hindsight to assure accurate valuation);
Joseph M. Dodge, Rethinking Section 2036(c), 49 Tax Notes 199, 201 (Oct. 8, 1990) ("The
compelling policy reason to tax the property when the transferor ceases to own the re-
tained interest is that taxing it at such time is the only way that is capable of accurately
valuing the amount actually transferred from the transferor to the transferee(s)."); Gut-
man, note 179, at 655 ("Consequently, if postponing the taxable event results in more accu-
rate measurement of the amount transferred, there is no tax reason to reject deferring the
taxable event.").
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residual interest in the transferor's gross estate.182 A broader hard-to-
complete rule taxes retention value by postponing the taxable transfer
until the transferor terminates ownership in the business.
In contrast, an easy-to-complete rule taxes the earliest event, typi-
cally the first gift. By tying the taxable transfer to a volitional act and
separating the tax from obligations of the estate, this rule makes it
more probable that funds will be available to pay the tax. Transferors
are more likely to anticipate and provide for a gift tax. An example of
an easy-to-complete rule is § 2701, which essentially presumes that
certain preferred rights will be exercised to transfer wealth to residual
shareholders. 183 A broader version taxes retention value by creating a
taxable transfer of the business upon the first transfer of stock.184
Although altered gift completion rules draw upon the cultural as-
sumption that parents provide for their children, widespread sympa-
thy for the object of taxation suggests that such rules for minority
discounts are too harsh.185 If aimed at a broad array of managerial
rights, both hard-to-complete and easy-to-complete rules strike at the
activity that lies at the heart of the family business. The estate freeze
legislation shows that such rules are likely to be viewed as burden-
some.186 So does the longstanding policy controversy over the taxa-
tion of transfers of services and business opportunities.lb7 Although
such taxation raises administrative concerns about liquidity and valua-
tion, the core objection is that it infringes upon quintessential family
business activity.188 Concerns about familial activity make one reluc-
182 Section 2036(c) had elaborate rules to assure taxation of distributions and disposi.
tions made prior to the donor's death. See IRC § 2036(c)(4) (1988).
183 For the mechanics of § 2701, see note 65.
184 This version has different forms. It could treat the transfer of a minority interest as a
gift of the entire company, or it could treat the transfer of a minority interest as the trans-
fer of control, that is, as if the gifted interest held all voting rights.
185 See Dodge, note 10, at 255 (dismissing hard-to-complete rule for minority discount
transactions as impractical).
186 A hard-to-complete rule is particularly onerous because it bunches the transfer tax,
increasing the likelihood that the family business will be sold in order to pay taxes. The
specter of such sale was critical in repealing § 2036(c) and replacing it with chapter 14. See
Blatt, note 129, at 323.
187 Compare Gutman, note 179, at 672-73 (defending taxation of wealth attributable to
services or control exercised by decedent), with Ronald D. Aucutt, Further Observations
on Transfer Tax Restructuring- A Practitioner's Perspective, 42 Tax Law. 343, 348-50
(1988) (arguing that nonproperty transfers lie outside the transfer tax system). Compare
Randall . Gingiss, The Gift of Opportunity, 41 DePaul L Rev. 395, 395-98 (1992)
(describing transfers of services and opportunities as "loopholes"), with Case
Hoogendoorn, Transfers of Opportunities-An Opportunity to Avoid Transfer Tax?, 71
Taxes 892, 901 (1993) (defending distinction between opportunity and wealth). See gener-
ally Paul L. Caron, Taxing Opportunity, 14 Va. Tax Rev. 347,402-23 (1994) (discussing gifts
of opportunity).
188 See Aucutt, note 187, at 349-50 (arguing that taxation of opportunities is "simply too
intrusive into intrafamily relationships. Everyone knows that family members advise one
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tant to tax these transfers even in the absence of administrative
concerns.'8 9
C. Aggregating Transfers
The cultural constructs suggest less resistance to proposals that ag-
gregate stock transfers. 190 These proposals would reverse Estate of
Bright,'9' which ignored not only stock owned by other family mem-
bers but also stock owned by the donor and donee. Under Bright, a
parent who owns all the stock of a corporation can make three succes-
sive one-third transfers to a child and claim a minority discount on
each. Even the second transfer is valued by reference to a hypotheti-
cal person who owns no stock rather than the actual participants in
the transfer who do.192
Reformers often criticize this aspect of Bright. It is incongruous to
treat the second transfer as part of a minority interest when, in fact, it
is continuously held as part of a control block. The snag comes in
choosing whether to value that transfer by reference to the donor or
the donee. The donor rule usually has broader reach. It treats a sec-
ond one-third transfer as participating in control regardless of the do-
nee's holdings. By contrast, the donee rule treats such transfer as
participating in control only if the donee receives other stock.
193
Current law provides no overall guidance to the choice between do-
nor and donee. The general estate tax rule looks to the value owned
another, affirm one another, and assist one another in innumerable ways. Such is the stuff
of family."); Gingiss, note 187, at 426-29 (proposing exempting closely held business from
the transfer tax in order to encourage the development and growth of family business);
Hoogendoorn, note 187, at 900-01 (exemption of transfers of opportunities necessary to
encourage "family-based economic activity").
189 For example, waiver of executor or trustee fees does not result in a taxable gift even
if the amount is fixed by statute. See Rev. Rul. 70-237, 1970-1 C.B. 13; Rev. Rul. 66-167,
1966-1 C.B. 20.
190 See Cooper, note 4, at 227, 231 (proposing to value gifts by loss in value to the do-
nor); Feld, note 10, at 945 (suggesting presumption that transfers of stock in a closely held
corporation by controlling shareholders are made to transferees who will be part of the
control group); Fellows & Painter, note 10, at 923 (proposing that gratuitous transfer of
shares from donor who originally owned controlling interest be valued as if they were part
of the controlling block). But see Monical, note 10, at 791-97 (proposing to value gift by
reference to value received by the recipient). One can also combine these rules. Professor
Dodge has proposed valuing at the higher of the value to the donor or the donee, on the
theory that any other rule distorts dispositions. See Dodge, note 10, at 254-56.
191 Estate of Bright v. United States, 658 F.2d 999 (5th Cir., 1981).
192 Cf. Estate of Lee v. Commissioner, 69 T.C. 860 (1978) (valuing stock in decedent's
estate without reference to other stock owned by person to whom stock is bequeathed);
Ltr. Rul. 9432001 (Mar. 28, 1994) (same). See also Repetti, note 10, at 432-33.
193 The donee rule has broader reach only in the rare case in which the donor never held
a controlling interest.
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by the transferor at the time of death,' 94 yet longstanding specific
rules tax the value inherited by the heir.195 Furthermore, the gift tax
looks to the transferee more often than the estate tax does. Its tax
exclusive base 196 and annual exclusion' 97 both adopt the donee's
perspective.
On the narrow question of discounts, current law provides more di-
rection. Under the estate tax, minority discounts are determined by
reference to the decedent.198 Thus, the choice between donor and do-
nee rules raises the question of the desirability of a discrepancy be-
tween estate and gift taxes.199 Most reformers would eliminate this
discrepancy by valuing the gift by reference to the donor,2 00 which is
also the rule adopted for lapsing voting rights.20' They argue that this
rule promotes fairness among similarly situated persons by treating
donors and decedents alike and levels the playing field among prop-
erty dispositions by reducing the tax incentive for lifetime gifts.202
The argument for a donor rule diminishes, however, if the gift truly
destroys value, that is, if fragmentation makes the property less salea-
ble. In that case, a donor making lifetime gifts is not truly comparable
to a decedent bequeathing property to different heirs. By exempting
economic waste and personal lifetime consumption, the transfer tax
necessarily treats donors and decedents differently. Failure to tax real
diminution in value does not produce unfairness or create incentives
to transfer property.Z0 3
The cultural constructs indicate that a rule aggregating stock trans-
fers is more palatable than proposals that attribute ownership among
94 IRC § 2033. This provision often is read as referring to the moment prior to death.
See Dodge, note 10, at 253.
195 IRC §§ 2039, 2042 (including death benefits and life insurance in gross estate); see
Dodge, note 10, at 253-54.
196 The gift tax is assessed on the amount received by the transferee whereas the estate
tax is imposed on the amount surrendered (including the tax paid) by the transferor. Thus,
assuming a 50% rate, a $100 gift results in $50 tax, while a $150 estate would pay a $75 tax.
197 IRC § 2503 (excluding the first $10,000 given each donee).
198 See note 43.
199 See Estate of Murphy, 60 T.C.M. (CCH) 645, 659-66 (1990) (disallowing minority
discount, in part because Congress intended to eliminate disparate impact of estate and gift
taxes).
20 See note 190.
201 IRC § 2704(a).
22 See generally Repetti, note 10, at 470-72, 474-81 (applying efficiency and fairness
analysis to issue of minority discounts).
23 Even if lifetime fragmentation of property does not destroy value, discrepancies be-
tween estate and gift taxes may be appropriate. The behavioral impact of a tax is not
necessarily minimized by maintaining a constant present value. Depending upon the rela-
tive elasticities of gifts, bequests, and consumption, a lower effective gift tax may be less
distortionary. Alternatively, any incentive for lifetime gifts created by a donee rule might
further a purpose of transfer taxation by encouraging the dispersion of wealth.
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family members or tax disguised transfers occurring through the exer-
cise or nonexercise of retained rights. Aggregation applies only if the
donor or donee personally owns a controlling interest, regardless of
whether their family owns such interest. Thus, an aggregation propo-
sal is narrower than stock attribution proposals.20 4 Nor would aggre-
gation "penalize" gifts to family members. It only presumes that the
donor or donee will maximize the price of a minority block by selling
it with other stock.
The cultural constructs also help choose between donor and donee
rules. As the broader approach, a transferor rule is most plausible
when the taxpayer is closely associated with concentration of wealth.
This association is longstanding under the estate tax. Its enactment in
1916205 and increases in the 1930's20 6 responded directly to popular
fears of concentrations of wealth.20 7 Accordingly, it makes sense that
the estate tax determines value by reference to the decedent.
Conversely, a transferee rule becomes more attractive when the
taxpayer is less closely associated with concentration of wealth. That
rule eliminates discounts only when multiple transfers are made to a
single person. A donee rule may be appropriate under the gift tax
because of the weak association of that tax with concentrated wealth.
The gift tax was a controversial and belated addition to the transfer
tax system. It was enacted in 1924,208 repealed in 1926,209 and reen-
acted in its current form in 1932,210 16 years after enactment of the
estate tax.21' Furthermore, a donee rule may coincide better with
contemporary attitudes. In the transfer tax legislation of the last 50
years, concerns for family businesses have supplanted fears of concen-
trations of wealth.212 In this environment, a donor rule may not com-
mand support beyond egregious tax avoidance.
2N See Bogdanski, note 32, at 4-63 (distinguishing proposals that aggregate transfers
from those that attribute stock ownership).
205 See Revenue Act of 1916, Pub. L. No. 271, §§ 200-212, 39 Stat. 756, 777-80.
206 See Revenue Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 216, § 405, 48 Stat. 680-754-55; Revenue Act
of 1935, Pub. L. No. 407, § 201, 49 Stat. 1014, 1021.
2=7 See Blatt, note 129, at 344-45.
2w See Revenue Act of 1924, Pub. L. No. 24-176, §§ 319-24, 43 Stat. 253, 313-16.
209 See Revenue Act of 1926, Pub. L. No. 26-20, § 1200(a), 44 Stat. 9, 125-26.
210 See Revenue Act of 1932, Pub. L. No. 32-154, §§ 501-32, 47 Stat. 169, 245-59.
211 See generally C. Lowell Harriss, Legislative History of Federal Gift Taxation, 18
Taxes 531 (1940).
212 See Blatt, note 129, at 315-17.
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Tax Law Review
[Vol. 52:
MINORITY DISCOUNTS
D. Presuming That Minority Interest Is Worth at Least its Pro
Rata Share of the Value of Corporate Assets if Sold
in Liquidation
The cultural constructs suggest positive support for a final proposal,
one that provides that a minority interest in a family-owned corpora-
tion is worth at least its pro rata share of the value of corporate assets
if sold in liquidation.213 This proposal does not affect discounts al-
lowed from other baselines. If, for example, the business is worth $3
million if liquidated and $4.5 million if maintained, the proposal gives
a one-third interest a minimum value of $1 million. It thus applies
family attribution for a single valuation method. In determining share
value under the asset method, the proposal assumes that family mem-
bers act in concert.
This proposal would have a similar effect to current provisions dis-
regarding restrictions that depress the value of property.21 4 Like
those provisions, it would eliminate discounts when liquidation value
exceeded going concern value. The proposal, however, would extend
current law in two ways. First, it would eliminate exceptions for ar-
rangements comparable to those entered into in arm's length agree-
ments215 or no more restrictive than those generally applicable under
law.21 6 Second, the proposal would mandate the use of liquidation
value. Current law admits the possibility that the business would not
be liquidated even in the absence of legal restrictions. 72 " Controlling
shareholders might benefit from maintaining a corporation as a going
213 Cf. Reg. § 1.453-1(d)(2)(ii) (minimum value of an installment obligation is the fair
market value of the property sold). See also Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7)(B)
(1997) (holder of bankruptcy claim receives an amount not less than value of holder's
interest). Under this proposal, the value of undivided real property would equal the sum
of the values of the divided parcels, less the costs of partition.
214 See IRC §§ 2703, 2704(b).
215 Section 2703 applies only to agreements not comparable to those entered into in an
arm's length agreement. See IRC § 2703(b)(3).
216 Section 2704(b) does not apply to agreements subject to § 2703. Reg. § 25.2704-2(b)
(excluding from § 2704(b) "an option, right to use property, or agreement that is subject to
section 2703"). Nor does it apply to restrictions more onerous than those generally appli-
cable under state law. IRC § 2704(b)(3) (exempting restrictions imposed or required to be
imposed by state or federal law); Reg. § 25.2704-2(b) (restricting § 2704(b) to limitations
on liquidation (in whole or in part) that are more restrictive than those that -would apply
under the State law generally applicable to the entity in the absence of the restriction").
217 See Preamble to Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 56 Fed. Reg. 46245,46247 (Sept.
11, 1991) ("[D]isregarding an applicable restriction does not arbitrarily require that an
interest be valued at its liquidation value."); E. James Gamble, Will Chapter 14 Freeze
Buy-Sell Agreements and Make Lapsing Rights Disappear?, 26 Inst. on Est. Plan. § 1305.1
(1992) ("Nothing in section 2704(b) or the regulations provides that liquidation value
rather than going concern value is to be used if an applicable restriction is ignored.").
Delaware courts, for example, do not use liquidation value as a minimum for appraisal
proceedings, reasoning that dissenting shareholders cannot force liquidation. Sec Rapid-
American Corp. v. Harris, 603 A.2d 796, 802-03 (Del. 1992) (rejecting use of break up
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concern; the value they could extract from minority shareholders
might exceed the amount they would receive upon liquidation. In
contrast, the proposal would require using pro rata value even if con-
trolling shareholders benefit from maintaining the business as a going
concern.
The proposal would narrow family attribution to a situation in
which joint action is especially likely. If owners are rational, a busi-
ness should be worth at least the value of its assets. Notwithstanding
arm's length bargaining and state law, the owners would liquidate im-
mediately a business whose assets were worth more than the going
concern and put the proceeds to better use.2 18 The continuation of
such a business can only mean that the amount that the controlling
shareholder extracts from the corporation exceeds the amount she
could receive from liquidating it and investing the proceeds. Such ex-
traction occurs at the expense of the other shareholders, whose funds
are underinvested. 219
The cultural constructs provide powerful support for adopting pro
rata asset value as a minimum. First, they suggest that it is exceed-
ingly unlikely that a controlling shareholder will deliberately waste to-
tal family wealth. More importantly, they suggest popular support for
applying family attribution under the asset method. The proposal
would increase taxes on family members, but it would do so in a way
that targets concentrations of wealth. It would fall heavily on passive
holding companies, for whom liquidation value exceeds going concern
value. It would deny only discounts predicated upon adverse tempo-
ral interests-where some shareholders benefit from continued opera-
tion while others benefit from immediate termination.
By contrast, the proposal would exclude most family businesses. It
would fall lightly on operating companies, which are ordinarily worth
more than their underlying assets. The proposal would exempt most
value attributable to activity. It would not tax future services and, as a
practical matter, would have difficulty reaching intangible assets like
value); Bell v. Kirby Lumber Corp. 395 A.2d 730,735 (Del. Ch. 1978) (rejecting liquidating
value of stock as the sole measure of value).
218 See Estate of Curry v. United States, 706 F.2d 1424, 1431 (7th Cir. 1983) ("In short,
the sole relevant consideration in determining whether the company here should be valued
as liquidated or as a going concern is which alternative could be expected to yield the
profit-maximizing result."); Elmer J. Schaefer, The Fallacy of Weighting Asset Value and
Earnings Value in the Appraisal of Corporate Stock, 55 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1031 (1982) (argu-
ing that market value is the greater of asset or earnings value).
219 If locked into an underperforming investment, a minority shareholder might be for-
going superior returns even if going concern value exceeds liquidation value. Identifying
this situation, however, requires knowledge of available returns. A minority share in a
high growth company may be more valuable than control of a poorly performing company.
When liquidation value exceeds going concern value, however, there is no doubt that the
minority shareholder can achieve better returns.
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goodwill, the value of which depends upon continuing services. Fur-
thermore, the proposal would have little impact on companies whose
continued operation benefits all shareholders.
The cultural power of this proposal is evident in the fact that it
catches the most commonly cited abuse: the use of entities to avoid
transfer taxes. The proposal would prevent taxpayers from reducing
value simply by passing property in corporate or partnership solution.
It thus frustrates the scheme underlying discount partnerships and ad-
dressed by the recent partnership regulations.220 It captures the suspi-
cion that such schemes lack economic reality, that is, that unrelated
persons would not create or maintain the entity.
On the other hand, the proposal potentially would increase taxes on
the family farm, the earliest, and prototypical, family business. 21 As
much a way of life as a profit making enterprise, the family farm often
occupies valuable real estate. Congress is reluctant to "penalize" the
family that decides to farm its land rather than to develop it as subur-
ban housing. Recent history suggests, however, that the family farm
has lost its premier position in the family business pantheon. Over the
last 30 years, such farms have disappeared from the economic= and
politicalm3 landscape. Recent defenses of the family business pay
more attention to its importance in productivity and job creation,2 4
and less to its function as a way of life. This shift in attention suggests
220 See note 8 (describing discount partnerships) and note 70 (describing partnership
regulations).
221 Unlike the European peasant, the American farmer owned his own land, a commod-
ity in its own right, see James Oliver Robertson, America's Business 25-30 (1985) (describ-
ing how Americans viewed land as a commodity), and produced for market, id. at 23-25
(describing how Americans viewed agriculture as a business). Over time, the ideal of the
family farm extended to small businesses more generally. See John H. Bunzel, The Ameri-
can Small Businessman 19 (1979).
222 This change reflected increasing concentration in American agriculture. See Richard
S. Kirkendell, A History of the Family Farm, in Is There a Moral Obligation to Save the
Family Farm? 79, 96 (Gary Comstock ed., 1987) (concluding that the family farm has be-
come "nearly extinct"); Ingolf Vogeler, The Myth of the Family Farm: Agribusiness Domi-
nance of U.S. Agriculture 3 (1981) (describing significant decline in farm residences from
1920 to 1977).
223 Compare Stanley S. Surrey, Reflections on the Tax Reform Act of 1976,25 Clev. St.
L. Rev. 303, 319-22 (1976) (describing role of farm lobbying in the Tax Reform Act of
1976), with Blatt, note 129, at 311 n.145 (minimal farm lobbying in transfer tax legislation
of the late 1980s).
224 See Mansel G. Blackford, A History of Small Business in America at xi
(1991)(describing increasing interest in small businesses on the part of historians, social
scientists, and faculty members at business schools); The State of Small Business: A Re-
port of the President xvii (1992) (finding small business accounting for 6S%,5 of net new job
growth from 1977 to 1987).
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that any residual concerns for the family farm may be addressed ade-
quately through existing225 or additional special provisions.
226
VI. CONCLUSION
Thus far, reformers have cast minority discounts as a classic tale of
tax avoidance. It is a tale of popular will subverted by a powerful
elite, of just laws undermined by arcane schemes, of high tax rates
eroded by crafty planning. In this tale, the reformer plays the hero.
He challenges the elite and uncovers the schemes. He reveals minor-
ity discounts as mere subterfuge.
This tale gets attention, but at a cost. The reformer gets bogged
down in technical arguments over how the market would price prop-
erty, to which he can respond by either qualifying or oversimplifying
his position. He can admit that he doesn't know the appropriate level
of discount or maintain that none ought be available. At the same
time, he has difficulty garnering political support. Popular outrage at
the elite runs remarkably shallow. Despite his protests, his allies are
easily swayed by sympathetic stories. Too often, the reform effort
grinds to a halt.
This Article presents a less dramatic but hopefully more realistic
tale. Economic analysis suggests that one cannot confidently deter-
mine what discount, if any, would be produced on the market. More-
over, the tale is not simply one of the battle between elites and the
people. Much of the conflict plays out in cultural ideas to which all
subscribe. Prosaic as it may be, this tale provides a means of sus-
taining a commitment to taxing the wealthy.
225 See IRC § 2032A (valuing farm property as a farm rather than at its highest and best
use). Family farms also benefit from provisions granting relief to small businesses gener-
ally. See, e.g., IRC § 2033A ($1.3 million exclusion for family-owned businesses); IRC
§ 6166 (deferred payment for closely held business interests).
226 In the 1998 Budget, Treasury proposed eliminating valuation discounts, except as
they apply to active businesses. See note 70. Going beyond the proposal described in the
text, the Treasury proposal incorporates the cultural distinction between family businesses
and concentrations of wealth. Thus, for example, it would allow a full discount to a family
farm that is worth more as suburban housing.
The drawbacks to the Treasury proposal are those associated with overt reliance on cul-
tural constructions. The proposal appears more arbitrary because it deviates more from
fair market value. It would disallow not just the discount attributable to the existence of a
business entity, but also that attributable to joint ownership. Similarly, the proposal would
deny a minority discount even when the whole family owns a minority interest. It thus
would disallow discounts for small holdings in a closed-end mutual fund.
Furthermore, by explicitly incorporating the active business concept, the Treasury pro-
posal is less easily administered. It mandates a new and potentially controversial set of
allocations distinguishing between readily marketable assets and reasonable working
capital.
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